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The specter of refugees is inextricably linked to a state's national security 
interests. Mass movements of refugees across international borders cannot possibly 
be absorbed without incurring political, social, and economic costs to the receiving 
state. To contribute to regional stability and international peace, the United States 
must be vigilant to the dangers and tensions inherent in the international problem of 
refugees. Nowhere have the complications of hosting refugees been demonstrated 
more clearly than in the case of Thailand in the past two decades. As the United 
States faces ethical, political, and social dilemmas posed by the threat of refugees to 
its national security, an examination of Thai refugee policy may be helpful in 
, ,. . 
formulating an American policy on this important issue. 
This thesis will call attention to the extent of the world's refugee problem; how 
some states have exploited refugees as instruments of their foreign policy; and what 
action receiving states can take to minimize the destabilizing effects of refugee 
populations on their borders. Specifically, I will examine Thailand's refugee crises 
with Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Thailand's experience with refugees is a 
microcosm of a universal problem. Finally, it will draw broad lessons from the Thai 
experience for the consideration of U.S. policy-makers responsible for refugee issues. 
v 
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The specter of uncontrolled refugee poses a national securitv risk to states that rect>i\ t' tht>m 
Terrorists and economic migrants disguised as asylum-seekers will seek entry into wealthier nation::; 
Mass migrations can cause domestic upheaval by draining scarce national resources and eroding the 
social fabric ofthe state. 
This study provides suggestions for minimizing the impact of uncontrolled refugee flows upon 
the United States by drawing lessons from Thailand's experience with unwanted refugees from 
Vietnam_ Laos and Cambodia. As the United States moves towards restricting immigration. it 1s 
important to distinguish between immigrants and refugees, the latter deserving the traditiunCJI 
compassion and generosity America has to offer people in need. It is possible to remain open w 
refugee admissions, but it can only be accomplished by weeding out bogus asylum claim::; and 
recognizing the undue political pressures of lobby groups to admit certain group::; of refugee::; 
Thailand was selected as the case study because it faced major refugee inflov.s since 197" 
More than one million Laotians, Cambodians. and Vietnamese seeking to flee the persecution of 
Communist regimes crossed the border into Thailand, the first country of asvlum For almost T\\ o 
decades, the Indochinese refugees in Thailand presented enormous potential for upsetting its path to 
development and economic growth. By combining pragmatic policies, the Royal Thai Government 
(R TG) was able to employ the humanitarian assistance of the international community to ensure that 
the refugees did not pose a threat to its national security Most importantly. the RTG etlectivel\ 
balanced humanitarian concerns while minimizing pull factors (refugee attracting policies) such as 
granting asylum and third-country resettlement. 
From examining the Thai experience, there were three discernible groups of refugees that 
followed the political downfall of a government. First, refugees that were sympathetic or employed 
by the losing side were expected. This group was usually highly educated and received without much 
rancor by the receiving state. Second, the next wave of refugees were the political targets of the nev. 
government. This group encompassed people who were not able to leave in the first wave, relative::; 
of the first-wavers, and persecuted for having ties to the former government Third, this last wave 
of refugees is usually uneducated and fleeing from the economic deprivation caused by misguided 
policies of the new government They generally have no ties to the fallen government and are 
XI 
primarily seeking economic relief 
As coni1icts based on ethnicity, ethnonationalism, and religion continue to proliferate isolated 
\vars. refugees will continue to be generated The United :\ation~ High Commis~ioner for Refugee~ 
seeks "durable solutions" to the overwhelming numbers of dislocated peoples As the receiving state. 
Thailand has worked with the generating states for bilateral cooperation Voluntary repatriation 1-; 
a favored solution. This occurs when the sources of conflict abate and stabilitv is restored The 
Indochinese governments are working towards this goal. This was the only means for Thailand to 
be rid of their refugees 
The United States faced similar situations with Cuba. Haiti. and Mexico Increasingly. the 
margin betw·een economic migrants and political asylees is closing Lnli!-;e the Royal Tha1 
Government, however, the United States does not recognize the end of the Cold War in its refugee 
admissions policies. Strong lobby groups of former refugees and/or people with shared ethn1cit\ are 
determining the refugee policies of our government Cubans and refugees from other former Sc)\'iet 
bloc countries receive priority admissions. This causes an anomaly in the acceptance rate of asylum-
seekers from these countries They are often admitted at the expense of others who lac!-; the pol it ic<ll 
lobbying voice in the United States but deserve preferential treatment in refugee admissions 
It is the conclusion oftrus study that immigration and refugee policies are intertwined There 
Js no moral compunction for restricting immigration to educated and self-supporting people 
However. in refugee admissions policies, we as a nation should be sympathetic to persecuted people 
suffering under oppressive regimes. These people should be admitted regardless of our politJc<ll 
relations with the state from which they come 
Moreover, the United States should follow the lead of Thailand by recognizing a need for 
bilateral cooperation between former enemies Past tensions with the Cuban government may have 
no place in the coming century. Just as Thailand has softened its policies towards its former enemies 
in Cambodia and Vietnam, the United States might follow the Thai example in dealing with Cuba 
Any improvement in relations with Cuba may decrease refugee flows into the United States and exert 
a positive influence on relations with Cuba's neighbors These are essential contributions to 
hemispheric economic development and political stability. 
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I. REFUGEES AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Refugees pose a national security risk to states that receive them. Terrorists and 
economic migrants disguised as asylum-seekers will continue to knock on the doors of 
wealthier developed nations. 1 As populations grow and conflicts based on ethnicity, 
economics, and religion occur in less developed and newly independent states, the trend 
for the future seems to be a continuation of refugee migration, internally and across 
international borders. Mass uncontrolled migrations will exacerbate existing tensions 
among class, ethnic, and religious divisions in the receiving states. 
This study provides suggestions for minimizing the impact of uncontrolled refugee 
flows upon the United States by drawing lessons from the Thai experience with refugees 
from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. As weak economic growth and the ever-growing 
budget deficit continue to burden the taxpayer, the refugee and illegal immigrant provides 
an easy scapegoat for the frustrations of Americans. For many countries incuding the 
United States, migration and refugees are tied together. Both illegal immigrants and 
political asylees are widely perceived to take jobs from Americans, erode the social fabric 
of the state, and receive entitlements that drain scarce national resources. In 1980, the 
Mariel Boatlift epitomized the ills of uncontrolled refugee and immigrant flows. In the 
1990s, continued migration from Third World neighbors including Mexico, Cuba, and 
1Telephone interview with U.S. State Department official. One of the inherent dangers 
of granting asylum to political refugees is the terrorist in disguise. The World Trade Center 
bombing is a prime example of how "refugee-warriors" carry out their agenda within the host 
country. In Thailand, many Lao were kept in controlled camps because of Communist 
elements within the refugee population that organized with Thai Communist insurgents to carry 
out subversive activities against the Royal Thai Government. For further information on false 
asylum claims from economic migrants and would-be terrorists, see Dick Kirschten, "Catch-up 
Ball," National Journal 7 August 1993, pp. 1976-1979. 
1 
Haiti are creating a backlash against immigrant populations in California, Texas, Florida, 
and New Jersey where many refugee populations live. 
As "compassion fatigue" hits the United States, more restrictive immigration 
policies will be legislated. Although our country was developed by immigrants seeking 
better opportunities in the New World, the cycle of xenophobia hits when Americans must 
compete with refugees and illegal immigrants for existing resources. Anti-immigrant 
measures such as Proposition 187 in California restrict health and educational services to 
illegal immigrants. When economies lag, immigrants and refugees are favorite targets of 
a frustrated populace. Unlike the well-educated middle-class refugees that fled Castro in 
the 1960s or Communist regimes during the Cold War, the latest waves are of a lower 
educational and economic class. 
By better understanding that refugee politics is driven by domestic lobbyist 
concerns as well as Cold War foreign policy, the United States government can pursue 
new agreements with states to address the roots of refugee generation. As long as the 
traditionally generous American public perceives we are providing humanitarian assistance 
to the true asylum-seeker and not merely giving away valuable resources to the economic 
migrant, domestic rancor and political backlash will not occur. 
The recent uncontrolled exoduses from Cuba and Haiti signaled the threats that 
refugees pose for American national security. The potential arrival of Haitian boatloads 
on our shores was certainly a factor in the decision to invade Haiti. The threat of a second 
"Marie] Boatlift" scenario forced us to re-evaluate our unilateral Cuban foreign policy. 
Political asylum should not be automatic for Cubans despite the powerful political clout 
of Cuban lobbyists. Selection for immigration and asylum must be calculated on the basis 
of need and not the politics of special interest groups. 
Thailand has been selected as a case study for how a state may receive large inflows 
of refugees without incurring major domestic unrest specifically tied to their reception. 
It has been faced with major refugee inflows since 1975. Laotians, Cambodians, and 
2 
Vietnamese have fled to its borders seeking refuge from repressive Communist regimes 
and subsequent severe economic conditions. Over the past two decades, Thailand has not 
been without domestic turmoil as internal power struggles have ended in numerous 
bloodless coups. However, unlike its neighbors, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has 
not been faced with ideologica1 battles culminating in civil war. The numerous coups in 
the RTG did not create conditions for refugee generation. They created authoritarian 
regimes that suppressed democratization in favor of internal development towards 
achieving economic growth. 
As the refugees came over the borders, the Thais were determined to control the 
influxes and discourage further migration by instituting strict anti-refugee policies that 
would hopefully to deter major inflows. As a non-signatory to international refugee 
agreements, Thailand was not legally bound to provide protection for the refugees and 
labeled them as illegal immigrants rather than people fleeing persecution. 
Thailand's policies towards refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam illustrate 
how their presence does not necessarily preclude domestic upheaval. By understanding 
the political roots and consequences of refugee generation and reception, lessons from the 
Thai experience may be helpful in controlling inflows to the United States. The Thais 
were heavily criticized by the international community for their fluctuating policies. This 
author does not endorse the methods employed by the RTG. However, the United States 
can certainly incorporate modified policies that will afford the true asylum-seeker more 
effective protection and weed out the economic migrant that circumvents normal 
immigration paths by exploiting existing asylum procedures. 
B. SOURCES AND :METHODS 
This study is based on research compiled from numerous journal articles, topical 
papers, books, interviews, and information services including a Southeast Asia discussion 
list over the Internet. Sources include academicians knowledgeable in refugee politics, 
3 
refugees, students, field workers, dissidents, government agencies such as the United 
States Department of State, and field workers from non-governmental agencies including 
the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) and the United Nations High Commisser for 
Refugees (UNHCR). The background of the sources varies widely. Most are affiliated 
with government and humanitarian agencies. Although the UNHCR will figure 
prominently in this study, most of the refugee data and history was culled from USCR 
publications. I have found they are more objective in their reporting than the UNHCR or 
governments sources. To counteract the effects of bias, I have tried to offer viewpoints 
from all sides of the issues. 
The objective of this thesis is to illustrate the global problem of refugees, to show 
how they can affect a state Is national security, and to offer some broad policy suggestions 
for managing uncontrolled exoduses onto American soil by incorporating the methods 
employed by the Thais. These methods would include detention centers for mass exodus 
arrivals by boat, more stringent screening procedures, better control of our borders, and 
ameliorating the root causes of refugee generation. 
The first part of my thesis will defme refugee terminology and give an overview 
of the world Is past and current refugee problems. It will explain why refugee 
organizations must abide by legal defmitions and mandates in the process of providing 
humanitarian assistance. By providing a global assesment of the present refugee situation 
as threats to international security, it will show the magnitude of this ongoing international 
crisis. It is also necessary to provide a historical background of the origins and evolution 
of refugee relief to gain an understanding of what roles the core humanitarian agency, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the international community, play 
in providing refugee relief. 
The txxiy of this thesis will introduce a brief history of Thailand 1 s political culture 
as a basis for understanding their fickle policies towards refugees on their border. 
Following this assessment behind Thai policies, individual country case study analyses will 
4 
show which of the major push and pull factors induced the refugee exoduses. General 
push factors are economics, political, or social. Specific pull factors are resettlement, 
improved economic conditions, and asylum. Although all factors are present in each case, 
certain factors alone or in combination dominate the root causes of refugee generation in 
these Indochinese situations. In the Laotian case, economics became the dominant factor 
after the intital wave of political refugees. With the Cambodians, political pressures were 
the root cause of refugee generation. For Vietnam, a combination of social and economic 
reasons dominated over the poltical considerations. The pull factors contributed to further 
refugee generation in all cases. 
As a conclusion, the Thai refugee experience from 1975 to 1992 will be assessed 
for correlating variables between the treatment of refugees and their ethnicity, prospects 
for resettlement, and political expediency. By extracting and modifying some of Thai 
policies, the United States can derive lessons in controlling bogus political asylum cases 
and uncontrolled mass inflows from our neighboring states in the Western hemisphere. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
A refugee as defmed by the Oxford English Dictionary is "one who, owing to 
religious persecution or political troubles, seeks refuge in a foreign country. "
2 The term 
was originally applied to the French Hugenots who came to England after the revocation 
of the Edict of Nates in 1685. In 1993, more than 16,255,000 people worldwide fled their 
countries of origin and were considered refugees. 3 For the purposes of this study, the legal 
20xford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 493. 
3U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), WarJd Refugee Snrvey--1994 (Washington, 
D.C.: [USCR]/ American Council for Nationalities Service[ANCS], 1994), 41. These figures 
are for December 31, 1993 and do not include the estimated twenty-four million internally 
displaced persons such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Statistics were 
compiled from various sources including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United 
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definition of a refugee as used by the United Nations (UN) and signatories of the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is: 
[Any person who]. .. owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence ... , is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it. (as amended by Article 1 (2) of the 1967 Protocol)4 
Refugees are the byproducts of both internal and international conflicts. The 
concept of protection by the international community did not come into force until the 
twentieth century. The United Nations Iligh Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the 
dominant international organization for managing refugee protection. 
Neither the Convention nor Protocol guarantees asylum to refugees. It regulates 
the conduct of the states who have agreed to abide by its principles of providing 
international protection. Above all else, it assists states in determining whether an asylum-
seeker fits the description of a refugee as prescribed by the UNHCR statute. 
Refugees differ from economic migrants and illegal immigrants. Economic 
migrants leave their country of origin for better economic opportunities. Although 
States Department of State, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). USCR was founded in 1958 as a private, non-profit organization of the 
Immigration and Refugee Services of America. It does not receive any government funds. Its 
mandate is to collect and provide information on refugees to U.S. policymakers and the public. 
4UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 
163. The Convention and Protocol are international instruments in matters relating to the 
treatment of refugees. The 1967 Protocol extends the scope of the 1951 Convention by 
removing the dateline and geographic considerations of 1 January 1951 contained in the 
original definition of refugee. The 1951 Convention has a geographic boundary of events 
occurring in Europe. 
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political conflict and worsening economic conditions are interrelated, some economic 
migrants circumvent regular immigration policies by applying for political asylum.
5 
Illegal immigrants are those that enter another country without immigration 
fonnalities. Most refugees fleeing conflict do not have the time to apply for paperwork. 
A state that wishes to avoid liability for protecting a refugee will sometimes classify the 
asylum-seeker as an economic migrant or illegal immigrant. 
6 They do not have a legal 
mandate to be afforded the protection of the international community. 
If detennined to be a true refugee, the asylum-seeker is guaranteed protection from 
forced repatriation or, non-rejoulement. 7 The fear of expulsion or involuntary return is 
the refugee's greatest concern. This concept of non-rejoulement is defmed by Article 33 
of the Protocol as: 
5UNH CR, The State of the World' s Refugees, 25. 
6Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International I aw (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983), 83. 
7Ibid., See Chapters V-Vlll for details on individual country laws concerning asylum 
and protection of refugees. Although refugee and asylum-seeker have the same meaning there 
is a subtle distinction between them that warrants further clarification. A refugee is always an 
asylum-seeker, whether temporary or permanent. However, unless the person is considered to 
have been persecuted under the UN mandated definition, the host country's government will 
not consider them eligible for asylum. Thailand does not allow their refugees to apply for 
asylum because the government considers them illegal immigrants. In this case, the 
withholding of refugee status by the government allows them to deny protection under refugee 
mandate. Under international law, the person must cross the border of his country of origin 
into a second country to be granted asylum as a refugee. If granted refugee status, he then 
applies for asylum to a country of permanent resettlement. If this country is different from the 
first country of asylum, it is considered third country resettlement. For example, the United 
States is usually a third country of resettlement because of its inaccessibility to most refugees. 
Once in the United States, he becomes an asylee. Refugees are not necessarily given asylum 
by a host country. Refugee has become a generally accepted term, e.g. the recent influx of 
Cubans in August-September 1994, but unless they can prove they have been persecuted on the 
grounds defmed in the UN defmition, they are not true refugees. 
7 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 11 
If a country such as Thailand is not a signatory to either the Convention or 
Protocol, it does not have a legal obligation to honor the concept of non-refoulement. 
There will be international pressure to honor this code for moral reasons, but countries 
such as Thailand are not in violation of any international code if they do not abide by the 
concept of non-rejoulement. In 1979, after vigorous protests by the UNHCR and other 
nations, the Thais reversed their policy of forced repatriation of Cambodian asylum-
seekers, but did not grant them asylee status. 12 
The act of granting asylum as a refugee under the UNHCR mandate will greatly 
impact the numbers of refugees considered in statistics generated by the international 
community. 
D. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
The mass movement of refugees across international borders threatens to destabilize 
governments, states, and regions all over the world. Although some refugee flows have 
wrought favorable changes, such as the East German influx that eventually helped bring 
down the Berlin Wall, most instances of refugee movements have created instabilities for 
receiving states. 
The flow of Haitian and Cuban refugees has forced the United States to reexamine 
its foreign policy towards neighboring states. President Bill Clinton cited the arrival of 
11 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refi1gees, 163. 
12Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International I aw, 77. 
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Haitian refugees as a major reason for the military invasion of Haiti. 13 Lawton Chiles, 
Governor of Florida, declared an impending state of emergency as Cuban asylum-seekers 
washed ashore on Florida's coastline. 14 Going against longstanding policy, Cubans are no 
longer granted automatic political asylum but housed instead in a refugee camp at 
Guantanomo Bay Naval Base. 
In Europe, the fear of refugee spillover from the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovinia 
is one reason for the lack of military intervention by the European Community. 15 Winston 
Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, lists the "spawning of 
refugees" as one of the "global risks" in the Pacific. 16 
Gil Loescher, a refugee expert at the University of Notre Dame, writes: 
These refugee exoduses are commanding the attention of high level policy-
makers not only for humanitarian reasons and because of the increasing 
numbers involved, but also because of the serious consequences that mass 
displacements have for national stability, international security and the 
emerging new world order. 17 
With the end of superpower rivalry, the absence of a bipolar balance of power has 
unleashed conflicts stemming from ethnic, cultural, and religious clashes. The ideological 
proxy wars have ceded to innumerable flashpoints such as the civil war in Bosnia-
13President Bill Clinton, CBS News Special Broadcast, 15 September 1994. 
14Lawton Chiles, New York Times, 18 August 1994, A12. 
15Patrick Moore, "Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia," RFE/RT Research 
Reports, 24 January 1992, 13. 
'~inston Lord, "A New Pacific Community, Ten Goals for American Policy," 
opening statement at confirmation hearings for Assistant Ssecretary of State before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 31 March 1993. 
17Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Papers 268, 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [TISS], Summer 1992), 3. 
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Herzegovinia, the ethnic conflicts in the fonner Soviet republics, and tribal genocide 
among African tribes in Rwanda, Somalia, and the Sudan. These localized wars have 
already produced large numbers of internally displaced persons and mass exoduses of 
refugees. There is a great likelihood of increasing numbers of low intensity conflicts into 
the twenty-first century. More refugees are likely to follow. 
In "The Coming Anarchy," Robert D. Kaplan writes, " ... as refugee flows 
increase ... national borders will mean less ... the real borders are the most tangible and 
intractable ones: those of culture and tribe. "18 If this is correct, international refugee 
crises along ethnic and religious lines will continue to proliferate. 
As conflicts occur, refugees will be generated. As global population expands, 
there will be increased competition for scarce resources. Refugee movements and 
migration patters are causally linked. Overburdened states are already reluctant to house, 
feed, and care for refugees and illegal immigrants. Refugees will more likely be labeled 
as economic migrants rather than as a political refugees. By categorizing the asylum-
seeker as an economic migrant, the first country of asylum does not have a legal obligation 
to grant him refuge. In order to avoid domestic social upheavals caused by the admittance 
of asylum-seekers, states will tend to restrict immigration. There is a strong correlation 
between the amity of interstate relations and tensions created by refugee problems. 19 
The numbers of refugees and asylum seekers decreased from 17.5 million in 1992 
to just over 16.2 in 1993. This significant drop is an inaccurate depiction of the true 
refugee situation. Senior Policy Analyst Bill Frelick of the USCR views this as a growing 
unwillingness by receiving states to grant protection: internally displaced and rejected 
18Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994): 60. 
Kaplan expands upon Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 
(Summer 1993). 
19Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, 5. 
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applicants for asylum are not considered in the fmal figures for refugee statistics. 20 If an 
asylum-seeker does not fit the country of asylum's parameters, the individual will not be 
counted as a refugee, but as an asylum candidate. The world's refugee numbers are still 
alarmingly high. These statistics were compiled from USCR's first-hand assessments, 
designations from the UNHCR, U.S. State Department, NGOs, the media, governments, 
private voluntary organizations, and human rights groups. 21 (See Appendix A for a 
complete list.) Figures for 1993 from the U.S. State Department's annual Refugee Survey 
were yet unavailable at the time of this study, Fall 1994. 
The following table gives a comparison between year end statistics compiled on 
31 December 1992 and 31 December 1993. (See Appendix B for a complete breakdown 
of generating and receiving states.) The numbers do not include selected populations in 
refugee-like situations. The statistics are for both refugees and asylum-seekers but do not 
include those refugees that have settled in other countries. 
Because the USCR is a compilation of different sources and a non-governmental 
organization, this study will use its numbers. The U.S. State Department must publish 
numbers dependent on official sources -that is, other governments. The UNHCR also has 
a political bias since it is bound to follow the Protocol's definition. Recently, it has 
recognized this shortcoming and compiled two sets of numbers. The first set uses numbers 
under the UN mandate, the second includes people it believes need protection but are not 
considered candidates for asylum by the country of first asylum. For these reasons, USCR 
statistics have been used. 22 
2~ill Frelick, "The Year in Review," in World Refugee Survey--1994 (Washington, 
D.C.: USCR/ANCS), 2. 
21USCR,Wor]d Refugee Survey--1994, 39. 
22Telephone interview with Virginia Hamilton, Editor and Assistant Director of USCR, 
11 October 1994. This confirms the author's opinions derived from comparing statistics 
between the organizations. 
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REGION REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS 
1992 1993 
Africa 5,698,450 5,825,000 
Europe 3,282,200 2,614,100 
North America 141,000 170,900 
Latin America and 107,7000 102,000 
the Caribbean 
East Asia and the Pacific 398,600 468,000 
Middle East 5,586,850 4,924,000 
South and Central Asia 2,341,700 2,151,000 
Total 17,556,900 16,255,000 
Compiled from USCR World Refugee Survey-1993 and USCR World Refugee 
Survey--1992. *North America consists of the United States and Canada. 
Table 1. 1992 and 1993 World Refugee and Asylum-Seekers 
E. ORIGINS Al\TD EXPANSION OF THE UNHCR 
To better understand the dimensions of refugee politics, a brief history of the 
evolution of the UNHCR is helpful in understanding why humanitarian relief is so 
politicized. Because the twentieth century produced the largest numbers of refugees in 
history, it was necessary to consolidate and legalize a concerted effort by the world 
community to deal with refugee issues. Refugee relief began in Europe, but its mandate 
spread globally. Presently, 122 states formally recognize the UN's mandate on refugee 
protection. Sixty-ones states remain non-signatories to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 
Protocol. Thailand remains in the latter category. 23 
23USCR, World Refugee Survey--1994, 45. 
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After the First World War, the transfonnation of the Russian, Ottoman, and 
Austro-Hungarian empires into more or less ethnically and religiously homogeneous 
nation-states produced the first major waves of refugees in the twentieth century. Out of 
the diaspora came a general unmixing of peoples and further consolidation of new borders. 
Large groups of displaced persons that remained within the newly fonned states were 
trapped. These were the minorities and stateless, of which many were the Jews, 
Armenians, and White Russians. They found themselves without the rights afforded a 
citizen of a state. 24 
The dramatic political and social upheaval caused by the. collapse of these empires 
produced interstate tensions. The minorities were often targeted as the source of 
deteriorating economic conditions and ethnonationalistic strife. A favored method of 
reducing such tensions was ethnic cleansing. It is estimated that more than one million 
Armenians were massacred by the Turks between 1914 and 1919. The remaining one 
million survivors fled to anyplace they could fmd refuge. Russia produced between one 
and two million refugees as a result of the Bolshevik revolution, the Russo-Polish war, and 
the Great Famine of 1921. Vogue tenns like ethnic cleansing and ethnonationalism that 
are frequently used by present day political scientists, journalists, and politicians have 
antecedents prior to the post-Cold War period. 25 
The chaotic conditions created by stateless persons in Europe were exacerbated by 
the new governments that encouraged "exit. "26 By allowing and encouraging persecution 
24Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence· 
conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 12-15. 
25Gi1 Loescher, Beyond Charity· international cooperation and the global refugee crisis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35. 
26Zolberg et al., 27. Adapted from Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and I Dyalty 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). Hirschman describes "exit" as the 
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of undesirable minority groups, displaced people all over Europe looked towards 
emigration as the answer. However, nations like the United States that had liberal 
immigration policies began to restrict quotas for two reasons. First, elites in Western 
nations wanted to encourage a national identity. They feared the political ramifications of 
allowing too many ethnic minority groups into their countries. Second, the worldwide 
economic depression put a strain on existing social services. 27 Today's arguments in favor 
of restricting immigration and denying liberal asylum are the same ones used in previous 
decades. 
To alleviate the plight of these refugees and decrease interstate tensions, the League 
of Nations sought a solution by fmding them permanent resettlement. Fridtjof Nansen, 
the Norwegian Arctic explorer was appointed High Commissioner on 1 September 1921 . 
His was to be a temporary post aimed at resettling refugees. Nansen was chosen for his 
previous humanitarian efforts in repatriating German and Austrian prisoners-of-war and 
providing famine relief to the Russians. He created the Certificate of Identity, or "Nan sen 
Passport", which gave refugees legal status in their host countries and allowed them to 
travel, but more importantly, to work. He died in 1930 in the midst of convincing 
governments to accept European refugees for resettlement. His temporary post was 
renamed the Nansen Office and lives on as the Office of the United Nation High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 28 
In addition to providing jobs for the millions of stateless persons, the Nansen Office 
was able to ratify the first attempt by the international community to provide the first 
official mandate for the refugees. The 1933 Convention Relating to the International 
alternative option to "voice" within societies where its citizens impose self-exile when dissent 
is not tolerated or effective against the ruling government. 
27Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 19. 
28Yeflille Zaijevski, A Future Preserved (Oxford: UNHCR, 1988), 7. 
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Status of Refugees defmed a refugee as someone "(a) outside their country of origin, and 
(b) without the protection of the government of the state. "29 It was a modest beginning 
with only eight signatories. 30 
The interwar years saw the rise in numbers of refugees fleeing from fascist 
government in Germany and Italy. Jews in particular were the most targeted group for 
pogroms. An ad fwc measure by the League attempted to ameliorate the plight of Jewish 
refugees. A special High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, James G. 
McDonald, was appointed in 1933. Its putpose was simply to resettle Jews and other 
refugees to other countries willing to accept them. The Office had no power to address 
or protest the political sources of refugee generation. As Germany was still a member of 
the League, it was impolitic to condemn the human rights abuses of Nazi Germany. 
McDonald Is authority was not commensurate with his responsibility. In frustration, he 
resigned. 31 Addressing the political roots of refugee generation is the number one 
hindrance to decreasing refugee generation today. 32 The UNHCR recognizes this but must 
concede to the sovereignty of the host country 1 s government. 
29Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International I .aw, 2. 
30Zaijevski, A Future Preserved, 7. 
31 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 20. 
32UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 8-9. 
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1920 Nansen appointed League of Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees 
1938 Evian Conference 
1943 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRAA) 
1947 International Refugee Organization (IRQ) 
1948 United Nationas Relief and Works Association (UNRWA)- creation of the Palestinian refugee 
camps 
1950 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) 
1951 United Nat ions Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
1956 United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) 
1957 Hungarians flee to western bloc 
Algerians flee to Tunisia and Morocco 
1959 Tibetans flee to India and Nepal 
1960 World Refugee Year 
African refugee movements through the 1960s and 1970s 
1967 Biafran War in Nigeria 
1969 Organization of African Unity (OA l1) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa 
1971 Bangladesh Crisis 
1972 UNHCR operations open in Thailand 
1975 Fall of Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Saigon 
First Wave of Southeast Asian refugees 
1978 Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia 
Second Wave of Southeast Asian refugees 
1979 Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees 
Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan 
1982 Third Wave of Southeast Asian refugees 
1984 Famine in the Horn of Africa 
Karen (Burmese) flee to Thailand 
1989 Second Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees 
End of the Cold War 
1993 Cambodian elections 
1994 Continuing repatriation programs throughout Southeast Asia 
Source: Lynellyn D. Long, Ban Vinai· The Refi1gee Camp (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1992). ]5. 
Table 2. A Chronology of Selected Refugee Events 
By 1938 the European refugee crisis had worsened. Under mounting political 
pressure from Jewish groups, President Franklin D. Roosevelt chaired an international 
conference of thirty-two nations in Evian, France to resolve resettlement issues. As the 
United States was not a member of the League, it joined with other non-League countries 
to form another ad hoc organization, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
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(ICGR). As with the other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), it was not effective 
in resolving the roots of refugee generation. The ICGR was able to facilitate an orderly 
departure of some German Jews, but not before they were stripped of the property by the 
Nazis. 33 
With the rise in xenophobia, economic hardship, and bigotry, many nations closed 
their borders to the Jews and other exiles. As quotas for immigration dropped from 
receiving states, the Nazis chose ethnic cleansing as a means to consolidate national racial 
purity. Many countries, including the United States, were reluctant to believe the reports 
of atrocities practiced by the Nazi regime. The Jewish experience later served as a very 
important moral impetus for Western nations to respond to future refugee crises. This 
would become a rallying point for many in the Cambodian crisis. 
By the end of the Second World War, over thirty million refugees had been 
generated. Never in history had so many people been dislocated by war. Other NGOs 
were created to tackle this enormous problem. During the war years, one of the first to 
be chartered was the United Nation's Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRAA). 
Confident of victory, the Big Three established this plan on 9 November 1943. The 
purpose of UNRAA was to return the displaced persons liberated by the Allies back to 
their countries. 34 More than three-fourths of the refugees were repatriated. Some went 
with great reluctance, especially self-exiled Soviets and Eastern Europeans who did not 
want to return to a Stalinist regime. This forced repatriation was strongly criticized by the 
United States as the Soviets exerted more control of their growing sphere of influence. 
33Loescher, Beyond Charity, 45. 
34William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, 5th ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 1156. The United Nations was formally chartered in 1945 at the 
San Francisco Conference of April 25-June 25. During the war years, an international 
federation based on the Atlantic charter was formed by the Allies and called the United 
Nations Organization. 
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The politicization of UNRAA policies lead to the formation of another ad hoc United 
Nations organization, the International Refugee Organization (IRQ). 35 
The IRO epitomized the coming split between the superpowers. Funded mainly 
by the United States, the expanded role of the IRO was to help "those unable or unwilling 
to avail themselves of the protection of the government of their country of nationality or 
fonner residence. "36 
It was a highly politicized organization that heightened growing East-West tensions. 
The United States was interested in assisting refugees fleeing the political persecution 
under "communism" whereas the Soviet Union barred exit from their bloc countries of 
people going to "capitalist" states. 37 Of the $400 US million IRO budget, $250 US million 
came from American coffers. Already burdened by the Marshall Plan, the United States 
did not have any faith in a short-tenn solution by the IRO. The United States became 
disenchanted as fears that she and her Western Allies would be expected to continue 
funding and handling the European refugee problem. It was felt that refugee problems 
could be resolved on a bilateral basis. 38 
Escalating Cold War politics, the partition of India in 1947, and other refugee-
generating world events forced a reassessment of the IRO by the United Nations (UN). 
Refugee problems were exceeding the authority and power of the IRO. The UN General 
Assembly voted on 1 January 1951 to create the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. Originally, it had a three year tenn to protect and provide 
35Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, 49. 
36Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Taw, 4. 
37By barring "exit", the Soviets could deny their citizens an opportunity to serve as 
models for dissatisfaction in their ideological utopia. Many states, including the ones in 
Southeast Asia view mass exoduses as a backlash against their policies. As a source of 
embarrassment, denying "exit" to their citizens is one aspect of refugee politics. 
38Loescher, Beyond Charity, 57. 
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lasting solutions for a permanent resolution for refugees created prior to 1 January 1951. 
As new refugee crises emerged, it was changed to five year terms with successive 
renewals. Its mandate was clearly humanitarian, not political. 39 Realistically, however, 
Cold War politics continued to dominate the course of the UNHCR and humanitarian aid 
efforts worldwide. 
F. REFUGEE POLITICS DURING THE COLD WAR 
Consistent with Cold War rivalry that infused most of the world's politics, refugee 
relief was not exempt. The world was now drawn along East and West camps. The 
United States lost confidence with the UN overall. The concept of universalism gave way 
to the harsh realities of incompatible ideologies and goals. In April of 1947, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff stated: 
faith in the ability of the United Nations as presently constituted 
to protect, now or hereafter, the security of the United States 
would mean only that the faithful have lost sight of the vital security 
interest of the United States and could quite possible lead to results 
fatal to that strategy. 40 
Up until 1954, aU refugee issues were resolved on a bilateral basis with NGOs 
outside the UN. Because of active intervention on behalf of the Jews during the war 
years, American policy reflected a commitment to accepting political refugees. In 
measures such as the 1953 Refugee Relief Act and the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, 
immigration quotas were expanded. The National Security Council viewed the Refugee 
Relief Act of 1953 as a "device to 'encourage defection of all USSR nationals and key 
personnel from the satellite countries' in order to 'inflict a psychological blow on 
39UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 169. 
40John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982),57. 
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Communism. 1 " 41 This granted almost automatic asylum for any immigrant from a Soviet 
bloc country. It set the precedence for Cuban refugees being granted asylum over Haitians 
seeking economic relief although both can arguably be considered refugees. 
Equally disgruntled was the Soviet Union and their bloc countries. It perceived 
the UN and its NGOs as instruments of the West to discredit their regime. "The 
recognition of East European emigrants as refugee stigmatized their countries of origin as 
willful violators of the human rights of their citizens. "42 It was little wonder the UNHCR 
was incapable of not offending either superpower despite their stance of neutrality. This 
recurring theme will be seen in Vietnamese and Cambodian refugee politics. 
As the Cold War was fought on every ideological playing field, the Soviet Union 
responded to the 1953 Refugee Act by offering amnesty and encouraging a drop-off in 
the"brain drain" from Eastern Europe. The Soviet bloc was committed to a policy of 
barring emigration. The American response was to wholeheartedly support the UNHCR. 
The first contribution of $500,000 US dollars was approved in 1955. Other countries 
followed suit and ensured its viability. 43 
Contributions to the UN 1 s annual budget is assessed wholly on a country's ability 
to pay. Wealthier nations like the United States pay the lion's share of the collected dues. 
Contrary to this established collection system, the UNHCR receives its funding from 
individual governments, agencies, and private organizations.44 Although in principle the 
41 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 27. 
42Loescher, Beyond Charity, 59. 
43Ibid.' 66. 
44Shelly Pitterman, "Determinants of International Refugee Policy: A Comparative 
Study of UNHCR Material Assistance to Refugees in Mrica 1963-1981," in John R. Rogge, 
ed., Refugees· A Third World Dilemma, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 18. 
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UNHCR was to be neutral and apolitical, its donors still had influence in the operations 
of the agency. 
In the 1960s, the growing problem of refugees shifted from East-West tensions in 
Europe and its bloc countries to the Third World. The only major European refugee crisis 
resulted from the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the Western hemisphere, 
the rise of Fidel Castro created a mass exodus of middle-class Cubans to the United States. 
The Soviets had effectively barred exit as a means to escape political persecution from 
their satellite countries. However, many conflicts in de-colonized Third World countries 
were proxy wars that had superpower backing. This was widely apparent in the 
Indochinese ideological conflicts. 
As post-colonial Africa produced newly independent states, huge numbers of 
refugees were also created. The UNHCR deemphasized the role of refugees in the 
ideological clash between the superpowers to those fleeing civil wars and ethnic strife. 
Unlike the refugees created from the Second World War in Europe, the African refugees 
were given third country resettlement as a last resort. The new emphasis was on regional 
integration or better yet, repatriation. The UNHCR mandate was humanitarian assistance 
first. 45 
The growing proxy war in Indochina also created victims of post-colonial conflicts. 
In the 1960s, the civil South and North Vietnam displaced people internally but did not 
create refugees fleeing international borders. Two reasons existed for this non-exodus. 
First, each side had safe havens for the uprooted civilians. Moreover, the 
internationalization of essentially a civil war by the United States meant the mass 
departures of Vietnamese citizens would detract from the idea of populace support for the 
war.46 
45Loescher, Beyond Charity, 77-80. 
46Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 164. 
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Although the concept of providing aid to refugees originated in Europe, the 
eruption of global crises in Africa in the 1960s combined with international media attention 
clearly made the 1951 Convention outdated. Largely as a result of the African crisis, the 
UNHCR recognized a need for overhauling its mandate. Subsequently, the UNHCR's 
1967 Protocol Regarding Refugees thus expanded the time and geographic defmition of 
a refugee to meet the growing demands of refugees everywhere. This time, the United 
States along with Swaziland, Cape Verde, and Venezuela became signatories. 47 Most 
countries in Asia including Thailand did not ratify this landmark Protocol. 
By the 1970s, the UNHCR was heavily involved in developmental aid and working 
with other NGOs. Global figures from 1970-1980 show an increase from 2.5 million to 
8.2 million refugees, an increase of 328 percent. In 1980, there were over 2.3 million 
from Asia alone. By 1990, the numbers had risen to 7.9 million. Asylum countries 
granted asylum to the refugees based on political leanings. The proxy wars such as the 
Vietnam War and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s were 
largely responsible for producing these large numbers of refugees in Southeast Asia. Once 
the United States pulled out of Vietnam, anyone who had previous ties to the United States 
government was persecuted. By this time, there were no safe havens within Vietnam. 
Ironically, the United States found itself as one of the primary resettlement countries. 48 
In the post Cold War period, the world is faced with the problem of repatriating 
many refugees generated by the proxy wars. Added to the list of stateless people are 
refugees from ethnic conflict and economic deprivation in this new era. Pull-factors such 
as the growth in telecommunications allows people of impoverished circumstances to see 
the economic benefits in developed nations, there will be more applications for 
47UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 167. This list does not include any 




immigration under the guise of political asylum. The old East-West tensions are gone, but 
the perpetual North-South disparity will exacerbate international tensions. 49 Determining 
the true refugee from an economic migrant is difficult since political conflict will 
exacerbate economic deprivation. Balancing humanitarianism without incurring domestic 
unrest is a challenge for the coming century. 
In the Thai experience, elements of both humanitarianism and inhumane policies 
were present in the twenty years of refugee inflows. Although they can be criticized for 
not offering more protection, the refugees crises did not disrupt their internal development. 
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II. THAILAND: A CASE STUDY FOR REFUGEE MANAGEMENT 
A. THAI NATIONALISM 
In 1975 the pro-Western governments in Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane fell 
to Communist forces. What had been a trickle of refugees in the early 1970s became a 
flood as hundreds of thousands of people spilled over from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos 
into Thailand. Because it had not been ravaged by war, Thailand had comparative 
stability and prosperity. Small numbers of refugees did not alarm the Thais. It was 
traditional for the Thais to offer resettlement to foreigners. Over 240,000 Japanese, 
Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotians, Burmese, and other Southeast Asians had been granted 
permanent asylum between the Second World War and 1975.50 However, by the late 
1970s, the small numbers of refugees seeking refuge became a torrent. 
Historically, Thailand has practiced "weathervane" or "bending in the wind" 
diplomacy. This approach is derived from the idea that Thailand is a small tree, drawn 
to big powers for whatever degree of protection can be provided in order to maintain its 
self-preservation. 51 By assessing and exploiting the merits of what a big power could do 
for their country, the Thais were able to remain uncolonized by the imperial forces of 
Europe unlike their neighbors in Burma and Indochina. Pragmatism remains the basis for 
Thai foreign policy today. 
Caught between the French on the East and British on the West, the Thais were 
artful and skilled manipulators who played Western colonial powers against one another. 
Thailand (Siam) remained a sovereign state under King Mongkut (r.1851-1868) and later 
his son Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910). The kingdom of Siam remained a buffer state 
5lLynellyn D. Long, Ban Vinai· the refugee camp (Columbia University Press: New 
York, 1992), 37. 
51Surin Maisrikrod, "Thailand's Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 14, no. 3, December 1992, p. 288. 
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between the imperialist expansionism of Great Britain and France. Whereas its Southeast 
Asian neighbors have had to overcome the social, political, and economic effects of 
colonization, Thailand steadfastly remained independent. 52 
The Royal Thai Government is the legacy of centuries of rule by Siamese kings. 
Chulalongkorn has been credited with modem reforms greatly influenced by Western 
political systems. He incorporated educated men into the ranks of leadership and shifted 
the absolute monarchy to one of patrimonial bureaucracy. At the time his successor, 
Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925) came to power, Thai nationalism was on the rise. The kingdom 
was a modern state, imbued with a sense of national identity. 53 
The absolute monarchical system of government came to an end in 1932. The last 
of the ruling monarchs, King Pradjadhipok (r. 1925-1935) was forced from his throne 
after a bloodless coup led by a university law professor, Pridi Phanomyon. Pridi was the 
leader of the radical right wing of the new provisional government, a constitutional 
monarchy. The coup was aimed at the royal ministers and not necessarily the institution 
of monarchy. Successive coups by various military and civilian authoritarians have vested 
political authority in the prime minister who serves as the head of the National Assembly. 
Yet, the monarchy to this day retains some symbolic importance and has yielded influence 
in state affairs as titular head of state. A patriotic slogan first coined by Vajiravudh, 
"Nation, Religion, King," has often been used as a national unifying theme for 
contemporary Thai policies. 54 
52David K. Wyatt, Thailand· a short history (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1984), 181-3. 




The present king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, is immensely popular in Thailand. Born 
in the United States and educated in Switzerland, he returned to Bangkok in 1951 to 
occupy the throne. The Thais view him and Queen Sirikit as the "embodiment of 
religion, culture, and history. "55 He has lent political legitimacy to several government 
actions and continues to wield considerable influence with those in power despite being bi-
partisan and not involved with decision-making processes. 
In constitutional Thailand, the succession of 'Thai authoritarians grappled for power 
with coups and counter-coups, sometimes referred to as "palace coups" for their bloodless 
quality. This era marked the domination of the military that struggled alternately with 
civilian leaders to retain power. To gain legitimacy for their rule, the Constitution was 
revised with each change ofpower.56 Under Field Marshal Phibun, the propaganda used 
to consolidate his power was nationalism. He renamed the kingdom of Siam Muang Thai 
(Thailand) or Land of the Free in 1939.57 
B. THAI POLITICAL CULTURE (1950-1990) 
The last forty odd years of Thai politics offer a glimpse into the two major 
motivations behind contemporary political and social thought, that of power, prestige, and 
wealth. This era was dominated by a strong military rather than a civilian government. 
Two reasons existed for this trend. The hierarchical nature of the army gave military 
rulers an edge over civilians autocrats that could not organize the warring factions into a 
consolidated power base. Parallel to this organizational edge, the military used the 
Communist insurgencies and anti-Communist rhetoric to legitimize their authoritarian rule. 
55Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in Barbara Leitch Le Poer, ed., Thailand· a 




The power sturggle between the military and civilian leaders was intense. Because of the 
perceived Communist threat, decision-making was dominated by the military. 58 For the 
United States, Thailand was a strong linchpin against Communism in the region. 
Thai leaders have shared a common trait. All have epitomized the traditional Thai 
love of power and wealth. "They fmd power seductive, alluring, irresistible, and even 
fascinating as long as the source of power is not an immediate, tangible threat. "59 It is 
imbued in Thai culture. From the days of the monarchical past, personal relationships and 
a client-patron system have governed how business is conducted. For a society based upon 
reverence for what power can achieve, it explains the continual ebb and flow of different 
leaders in Thailand. Komol Somwichien, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University 
describes what drives power politics: 
Power, from the smallest degree to absolute power, can change 
a man Is life ... Those without power, such as the poor people or 
villagers, praise and respect persons according to their power. 60 
The love of wealth stems from what power can bring to the patron: 
The Thai people perceive money and all other forms of wealth or 
property ... a the most important and desirable aspect of life. Money 
is the most crucial factor determining the behavior of the Thai people. 61 
58Maisrikrod, "Thailand Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina," p. 290. 
59Sukhumband Paribatra, "Thailand 1 s Interests and Policies," in Claude A. Buss, ed., 
National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 
217. 
6
'Xamol Somwichien, Democracy and Thai Society (Bangkok: Thai Wathana, 1973), 
58. Quoted by Girling, Thailand, 38. 
61Ibid., 36-7. Quoted by Girling, Thailand, 142. 
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Supporting the United States against Communism was viewed as vital to Thai 
national security. Following their "weathervane" diplomacy, the Thais chose to align 
themselves with a strong power that could repel the spread of Communism. With the 
withdrawal of American forces from the Indochinese theatre in the early 1970s, the viewed 
the United States as a declining power. The U.S. loss in Vietnam shifted Thai perception 
of American might. While the Thais had been a strong ally of the United States during 
the Vietnam War, they pursued a policy of near neutrality between 1975-1979. After 
1975, they looked to China as the big power in the region and pursued closer relations 
with Beijing. During these years, the Thais focused upon internal development and 
downplayed the politics of rivalry between the hegemons. 62 At the time of the first wave 
of refugees in 1975, then Prime Minister Kukrit was preoccupied with student dissidents, 
Communist insurgencies, and widespread domestic unrest. He was later replaced by 
General Kriangsak Chomanand in October 1977.63 The winds shifted again when the 
Vietnamese invaded Cambodia late December 1978. Once again, U.S.-Thai relations 
strengthened until the end of the Cold War. Bilateral defense agreements augmented the 
Thai arsenal and increased the presence of U.S. naval forces around Southeast Asia. 
"For Thai leaders, the environment must provide security from landbased threats 
from the north, west, or east. "64 (The south is bordered by the Gulf of Thailand.) When 
the refugees came in droves across their border, the Thais were once again faced with 
external aggression, especially by the Vietnamese. The Thais were quick to contain the 
situation. As a result of the Vietnam War, Thailand had benefited enormously from the 
war economy. Following the boom years of the 1970s, the Thais did not want anything 
62Paribatra, "Thailand's Interests and Policies," 215. 
63Seekins, "Historical Setting," 48-9. 
64Paribatra, 215. 
29 
to discourage foreign investment, including refugees. 65 Uncontrolled refugee inflows 
would have created economic distress and disrupted their plans for internal development. 
The history of refugee flows into Thailand reflects the turbulence caused by the 
Indochinese Wars and subsequent installations of Communist regimes. In the discussion 
that follow, the chronological events of refugee inflows into Thailand will be truncated 
into four time frames: 1975-1977, 1978-1982, 1982-1986, and 1986-present. These are 
general demarcations that show emerging trends in the demographic makeup of the 
refugees, Thai refugee policies, and international community response. 66 
From the Thai perspective, liberal asylum policies towards over one million 
refugees would have been disastrous to their economy, society, and national security. 
Despite their insistence on labeling all the refugee as illegal immigrants, the Thais granted 
a modicum of protection to the asylum-seekers. In 1975 at the onset of the refugee crisis, 
the Royal Thai government's official position on the refugees were: 
Should any displaced persons attempt to enter the Kingdom, 
measures will be taken to send them out of the Kingdom as 
fast as possible. If it is not possible to repel them, they will 
be detained in camps ... The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will 
act as coordinator with international organizations and contact 
the governments of Lao, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to ask 
them to repatriate their own nationals. 67 
65Long, Ban Vinai, 37. 
6Thid., she differentiates the Indochinese refugee flows into three waves. For this 
study, the time period 1986-present was added. 
67RTG Cabinet Decision of 3 June 1975. Ministry of Interior, Indochinese Displaced 
Persons in Thailand. (Bangkok: Ministry of interior, 1980), 3. Quoted by Supang 
Chantavanich, Marisa Phupinyokul, Philip Finch, Saikaew Tipakom, The I ao Returnees in 
the Voluntary Repatriation Programme from Thailand. Occasional Paper Series no. 003, 
Indochinese Refugee Information Center. (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn 
University, 1992), 21. 
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In 1979, the RTG under Kriangsak changed its policies to "humane deterrence." 
Following its repeal in 1983, the stance in 1988 became more of what could be termed 
"benign intolerance. "68 Faced with the potential for domestic social and economic 
upheaval as outlined in caused by refugees on their borders, Thai officials employed 
methods contrary to the humanitarian mandate of the United Nations but satisfactory for 
ameliorating national security risks to themselves. The refugees were not allowed to leave 
the camps except as "refugee-warriors" Khmer Rouge fighting against the Vietnamese. 
Conditions within the camps were as spartan as possible in order to appease surrounding 
locals who lived with even less resources than some of the UNHCR and NGO supported 
refugees. 
Components of the RTG successfully utilized the resources of the international 
community by receiving billions in humanitarian aid, of which a percentage went into their 
coffers. Furthermore, they refused to grant the refugees permanent asylum and called 
upon the Western countries to raise their quotas for immigration. 
After nearly two decades, the RTG is impatient to be rid of the last Indochinese 
refugees. Slowly, durable solutions are ending the crisis. The withdrawal of the 
Vietnamese signaled a step in resolving the political crisis in Cambodia. Vietnamese 
refugees presently in residing in refugee camps have no other means but to go home. The 
Hmongs and Lowlander Laotians continue voluntary UNHCR-brokered repatriation. 
Thailand's juggling of these various refugee crises although not admirable, has certainly 
been astonishing. Although ethical aspects of Thai policy can be debated, its efficacy 
cannot. 
6snns is a term coined by myself to describe the softened position from "humane 
deterrence." It is "benign" because refugees were no longer forced back to lethal conditions 
but "intolerance" because the RTG refused to entertain any thoughts that the refugees would be 
a permament fixture within their country. 
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ill. THAILAND AND LAOS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the push and pull factors effecting the policies of the RTG 
towards the Laotian refugees from 1975 to the present. Of the three Indochinese refugee 
groups that crossed into Thailand, the relationship between the Laos and Thais were 
significantly less confrontational. There are three major factors for this difference. Unlike 
the Vietnamese, the lowland Lao and Thais have blood-ties with common ancestors. "It 
is not often recognized by outsiders that there are more ethnic Lao living in Thailand than 
there are Lao living in Laos. "69 Second, the Pathet Lao Communists unlike the 
Vietnamese, do not threaten the territoriality of the Thais. Except for minor border 
disputes, the Thais were confident that a Lao invasion of Thailand was unlikely. Third, 
third-country resettlement to the West was a viable option because of past relations 
between the anti-Communist Laotians and the United States government. Most of the Lao 
were resettled to the United States. However, the Thais still do not want the Laotians to 
remain in their country and prefer repatriation as the fmal and durable solution. 
There are two major ethnic groups from Laos that comprise the refugee 
populations. The lowland Lao are descended from the Lao-Tai peoples (as are modern day 
Thais and Shans in Burma) and comprise the majority of the population in Laos. Their 
ancestors had forced the indigenous Austronesian (Moo-Khmer) Kha tribes from the 
valleys of the Mekong River and settled in the plains about the thirteenth century. The 
Moo-Khmer either fled to surrounding areas of what are now Southern China, Burma, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam or became their slaves. This ethnic group has usually ruled Laos. 
The other ethnic groups that make up Laotians are the hilltribes or highland Hmong, 
69Netnapis Nakavachara and John Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," John 
Rogge, ed., Refugees· a Third World dilemma (Totowa, NJ: Littlefied & Rowman, 1987), 
279. 
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descendants of people who migrated from southern China in the mid nineteenth century. 
Other minorities include the Meos, Lu, and others. The lowlanders generally cultivate rice 
in the valleys. The hilltribes practice burn and slash agriculture in the hills. 70 The cultural 
diversity of Laos was a hindrance to national unity. The concept of nationalism did not 
gain momentum until the 1940s. As a result, their more powerful neighbors the 
Vietnamese and Siamese were in a constant power struggle over Laos. 
Among its other problems, Laos has the misfortune of being geographically located 
in one of the most unstable regions in the world. Surrounded by Burma on its 
northwestern border, Communist China on its north, Vietnam on its eastern flank, 
Cambodia to the south, and Thailand to the west, Laos has been at the vortex of centuries 
of warfare. It is little wonder that stability and lasting peace have eluded this former 
kingdom for so long. 71 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
From as early as 1563 when the capital of Lan Xang as it was known then was 
moved from the Luang Prabang principality to Vientiane, the neighboring kingdoms of 
Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam fought over its suzerainty. In 1696, the king became a 
vassal of the Vietnamese in order to oust the pro-Siamese usurpers. This power struggle 
between Siam and Vietnam continued until the French colonized the area known as 
Indochina in 1884. Laos was prized as a possible overland trade route to China. Although 
this was never fully developed, a lucrative opium trade originated in the area known as the 
70Guy Morechand, "The Many Languages and Cultures of Laos," in Nina S. Adams 
and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. , I .a as· war and revolution, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Colophon 
Books, 1970), 30-1. 
71Richard S.D. Hawkins, "Contours, Cultures, and Conflict," in Adams and McCoy, 
Laos· war and revolution, 4. 
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Golden Triangle (northern Laos, northeastern Thailand, and eastern Burma). The French-
held protectorate was seized by the Japanese in March 1945.72 
When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the rivalry between Thailand and 
Vietnam which had lain dormant during French colonial rule reawakened. Alongside this 
rivalry was an emerging nationalism within Laos that was realized with full independence 
from French in 1950. The different factions that emerged were the Royalists, neutralists, 
and Communists, or Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao (literally "State of Laos") attempted to 
declare itself the only true government in 1953. During the next four decades, the 
different factions could never comprise to achieve national unity. Of the three groups, 
social change only interested the Pathet Lao, even if it meant alliance with the Viet Minh. 
The other factions were mistrustful of the Viet Minh and disinterested in incorporating all 
the ethnic and religious groups into the government. The original aims of the Pathet Lao 
were total liberation and unity of Laos. As partial payment for providing military support 
of the Pathet Lao, the Vietminh gained territorial control over a part of Laos. 73 
The tilt of the Pathet Lao towards Vietnam alarmed the Thais. During the colonial 
era, the French had encouraged closer ties between the Laotians and the Vietnamese. In 
the post-independence years, the Thais were once again outside the sphere of influence. 
After Eisenhower's Domino Speech, the United States positioned strategic forces in 
Thailand at their bequest. 74 The Thais were determined to keep Communism from 
spreading into their capitalist, pro-Western economy. Practicing age-old "weathervane" 
and pragmatic philosophy, the RTG relied heavily on U.S. support. For the next thirty 
years following the post-colonial Indochina, the struggle between the United States and the 
72Philippe Devillers, "The Laotian Conflict in Perspective," in Adams and McCoy, 
laos· war and revolution, 37. 
73Long, Ban Vinai, 32. 
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Soviet Union was fought in their backyard. Ironically, had there been less technologically 
advanced weaponry introduced by superpower presence, the civil wars may have been 
localized and certainly less lethal. Without U.S. or Soviet backing there might not have 
been the volume of refugees fleeing the war-ravaged countries of Indochina. 
C. THE FIRST WAVE (1975-1977) 
Post-independence Laos never saw a peaceful or stable government despite attempts 
by all sides to form a coalition government of Royalists, neutralists, and Communists in 
the early 1970s. When the actual takeover by the Communist Laotian People's 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) of Vientiane on 2 December 1975, the coup created a mass 
exodus of refugees. Up until then, the civil war had produced plenty of internal refugees, 
or displaced persons but each side had provided pockets of safe havens for their 
populations as well as commitment from both camps to maintain fighting. The American 
bombing missions often had forced internal migrations to remote areas or refugee camps 
but had not caused significant spillovers into neighboring countries. It had been in the 
interests of both sides to keep their populations from exiting. The fall of Vientiane 
signaled an end for the pro-American side and so Laotians fled for their lives. 75 
During the war, most of the CIA-backed supporters were the Hmong, a large ethnic 
minority group that inhabited the mountainous regions of Laos. They were recruited in 
large numbers during the war for two reasons. Many Hmong were economically 
motivated by the aid and salaries provided by the U.S. govemment.76 As guerrillas against 
the communist Pathet Lao, they fought with American troops and helped retrieve downed 
75Paul Rabe, Voluntary Repatriation· the case of Hmong in Ban Vinai. Occasional 
Paper Series no. 2, Indochinese Refugee Information Center (IRIC). (Bangkok: Institute of 
Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1990), 25. 
76Long, Ban Vinai, 34. 
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American pilots. Additionally, the Hmong wanted to preserve their culture against the 
communists. The Hmong are a semi-nomadic peoples that practice slash and burn 
agriculture, thus forcing them to migrate in search of fertile ground. They have deeply 
embedded cultural beliefs that promote this environmentally degrading method of fanning. 
Without the burning, they do not feel crops will grow. Their family system revolves 
around a hierarchical clan-like society.77 When the Pathet Lao came to power, the Hmong 
were particularly singled out for persecution and attrition. 
The 44,659 Hilltribe Lao (Hmong, Yao, Mien, and Htin et al) and over 10,000 
Lowland Lao in 197578 marked the first wave (1975-1977) of Laotian refugees into 
Thailand. The Highlander Hmong, who are not culturally close to the traditional ethnic 
Lao (Lowlanders), went to the Ban Vinai (Loei province), Chiang Kham (Phayao 
province), Sob Tuang (Nan province), Chiang Khong (Chiang Rai province), and Ban 
Nan1 Yao (Nan province) refugee camps. The Lowlanders went to Ban Pho and the Nong 
Saeng Screening Center. (By 1991, there were only three major camps, Ban Vinai, 
Chiang Kham, and Ban Pho as well as the Phanat Nikhom and Nong Saeng Processing 
Centers.)79 Among the Lowland Lao were uprooted ethnic minorities, civil servants, 
Chinese businessmen, and Vietnamese employees. 80 They fled from imprisonment in re-
77Rabe, Voluntary Repatriation· the case of the Hmong in Ban Vinai, 25. 
78Chantavanich et al., 3. 
79Thomas M. Foglietta, Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, Refugees and 
Asylum-Seekers From Taos· prospects for resettlement and repatriation, 102nd Cong., 1st 
sess., 1991, p. 2. (As a member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific, 
Mr. Foglietta chaired a fact-fmding mission to Thailand and Laos. This study was written by 
him and reflect his personal views and not necessarily those of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
or its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.) 
80Wng, Ban Vinai, 36. 
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education camps, indiscriminate killings of suspected insurgents, and deteriorating 
economic conditions from collectivized agriculture and a war torn country. 
Year Lowland Lao Hill tribe Total 
1975 10,195 44,659 54,854 
1976 19,499 7,266 26,765 
1977 18,070 3,873 21,943 
1978 48,781 8,013 56,794 
1979 22,045 23,943 45,988 
19 80 28,967 14,801 43,768 
1981 16,377 4,356 20,733 
1982 3,203 1,816 5,019 
1983 4, 571 2,920 7,491 
1984 14,616 3,627 18,243 
1985 12,388 623 13,011 
1986 - 4,223 4,223 
19 87 -
- -
19 88 - 1,323 1,323 
1989 -
- -
199 0 - -
-
1991 - - -
1992 - - -
Total 198,712 121,443 320,155 
Source: UNHCR, Bangkok (June 1992) in •The Lao Returnees,• 
Chantavanich et al., 11. 
Table 3. Number of Lao Asylum-Seekers in Thailand 
Thai JX)licy towards the refugees was closely linked to the response of the United 
States. Clearly as a result of the American pullout in Indochina, the Highland Hmong had 
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the most to lose. However, when offered resettlement in the United States, many 
preferred to stay along the porous border camps. 81 Of all the camps, Ban Vinai has been 
the most "open" in tenns of allowing movement in and out, although it was officially 
closed to newcomers after 1983. It has served as a base for guerrilla insurgency 
movements against the Communist Lao government led by General Vang Pao and his 
officers who were resettled in the United States but conducted an insurgency movement 
nonetheless. Many of the Hmong believed he would return and remained in the camps 
instead of resettling to a third country. Another factor believed to have discouraged 
resettlement was the difficulty of integrating into Western societies by those Hmong that 
chose this option. 82 The United States was the primary country of resettlement. Among 
this first wave group were the educated, those with close ties to the U.S. government, and 
those with family connections. Americans felt a particular obligation to their fonner 
allies. 83 
During this first wave, the numbers of Laotian refugees did not pose a national 
security risk to Thailand. The numbers were still manageable. The RTG declared them 
as illegal immigrants unless they passed a screening process conducted by the UNHCR that 
differentiated between refugees and economic migrants. This screening process was 
supposed to deter non-refugees, who were forcibly returned at the border, but in reality 
had little impact on the numbers of asylum-seekers. (The screening process was 
abandoned in March 1978). Asylum-seekers that were afforded refugee status had 
81In 1975, 1% (454 of 44,659) Hilltribe refugees chose resettlement. The other 99% 
chose to be "longstayers" (those that stayed in refugee camps for over a decade). In 1976, 
9.7% (4,593 of 46,878) and 1977, 5.1% (2,481 of 48,270) chose resettlement. No refugees 
were repatriated. From Rare, Voluntary Rf1Jatriation· the case of the Hmong in Ban Vinai, 
Table 1. 
82Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence, 169. 
83Long, Ban Vinai, 38-9. 
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prospects for third-country resettlement. Despite any label they were accorded, the 
refugees were not granted permanent asylum in Thailand. If they were determined to seek 
asylum, the Thais were determined that other countries like the United States would take 
responsibility for a permanent solution. NGOs and the UNHCR provided humanitarian 
assistance in the way of staff and funds. The Thais provided some staff and military, but 
the burden of maintaining the camps fell on international aid agencies. 
The RTG allowed the refugee camps to exist and looked the other way as the 
Hmong resistance fighters went back and forth between borders. The Thais allowed this 
type of loose refugee status because the Hmong were not interested in permanent 
resettlement within Thailand. This class of "refugee-warrior" also developed in the 
Cambodian camps. 84 The Hmong still harbored hopes of toppling the Communists in 
Vientiane. 
The Lowland Lao, who are ethnically similar to the ruling class in Laos did not 
have a desire to be refugee-warriors. Their motivations for crossing into Thailand were 
largely the promise of resettlement and better economic opportunities. As in Vietnam, a 
large number of the first wave of refugees were ethnic Chinese and American sympathizers 
who were encouraged by the new regime to leave. This initial exodus was not hindered 
because it lessened tensions and rivalries. By the end 1977, over 100,000 Laotian asylum-
seekers had crossed into Thailand. 
D. THE SECOND WAVE (1978-1982) 
Push factors in Laos included worsened economic conditions from the Communist 
regime's agricultural collectivization schemes, taxation policies, conscription, as well as 
overall human rights abuses. Flooding followed the drought of 1977. Added to these 
factors was the refusal by the LPRP of any developmental aid from the West. In 1978, 
the trend of refugees leaving Laos reversed itself. Approximately 35,000 more Laotians 
84Zolberg et al., Escape from Vio1ence, 169. 
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left in 1978 than in 1977. It raised well-founded speculations that economics combined 
with the potential of resettlement drove the largest outflows of Laotians seeking asylum. 85 
Thailand's response to this second inflow of Laotians was tied to the overall 
tensions created by war in Southeast Asia. In 1978, Cambodia was invaded by Vietnam 
and caused a massive dislocation of Cambodians over the border into Thailand. 
Economics and politics drove thousands of ethnic Chinese Hoa and pro-American 
Vietnamese from Vietnam over land and by sea into Thailand. In 1979, the Sino-
Vietnamese War spilled over into Laos. As allies with the Vietnamese, the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic (LPDR) allowed more Vietnamese advisors and troops into Laos. 
More than 128,000 Laos crossed into Thailand between 1978-1982. 86 
Meanwhile, Thai domestic politics drove refugee policy. In October 1977, General 
Kriangsak Choanand led a coup and toppled the civilian government of Thanin Kraivichien 
whose shortlived prime ministership was plagued by communist insurgency movements. 
Kriangsak came to power at a time when Thailand was undergoing an economic crisis from 
the second oil crisis. 87 Communist insurgencies and deteriorated economic conditions did 
not create an atmosphere of welcome for the refugees. 
During this second wave of refugees, Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees also 
began to migrate into Thailand to escape war, communism, and starvation. The refugees 
were articulated as threats to national security by government officials. The threats were 
classified into five categories: 
85Long, Ban Vinai, 40. 
86Chantavanich et al., The I an Returnees in the Voluntary Repatriation Programme 
from Thailand, 5. 
87Barbara Leitch LePoer, ed. Thailand· a country study (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office [GPO], 1987), 48-9. 
41 
1. Threat to the administration and governing system. A large 
number of refugees staying together sometimes create problems, 
such as drugs and crime. And the allocation of large areas of 
land for refugees also causes discontent among the Thai locals 
who have no farmland of their own. 
2. Political problem. Some refugees are members of the old 
regime who continue to fight against the present regime. 
Although the government does not support the opposition 
groups, the continuous fighting may cause misunderstanding 
between Thailand and Laos. Moreover, even though the 
government has tried its best, Thailand always been unfairly 
criticized for mistreating the refugees by human rights groups. 
3. Economic problem. The government has to allocate some of 
its personnel and budget for administering the camps. Additionally, 
when the government has to buy large quantities of supplies fom 
the local market, local people suffer from price fluctuations. 
4. Social problem. Some Thai villagers are jealous that refugees 
are better treated and supported. This may cause severe societal 
conflict between locals and refugees in the future. 
5. Security problem. When certain groups of refugees continue 
their fight against the Indochinese government, Thai villagers 
who live along the border are put in danger, especially as 
sometimes the fighting lures the Laotian army to cross the border 
into Thailand in order to suppress the oposition groups. Furthermore 
among the reufgees themselves, there have been some who have 
tried to arouse ill-feeling within the Laotian group 
against the Thai government. 88 
Kriangsak and his government reviewed and altered existing refugee policy. 
Although Western countries were accepting refugees for resettlement, the second wave's 
88Chantavanich et al., The Lao Returnees in the Voluntary Repatriation Programme," 
20-1. Excerpt of five threat categories from government publications and officials on 
refugees, Kasit Bhiroun, "Discussions on the Indochinese Refugees 1988-1990" (Thesis of 
National Defence College, 1990), 2-5. 
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large numbers overwhelmed the Thais. At the height of this second crisis, there were 
twenty-one refugee camps as well as transiting, processing, and detention centers. More 
refugees were coming into Thailand than were leaving. Although the UNHCR as well as 
voluntary agencies (Volags) and other NGOs were willing to bear most of the burden of 
maintaining the camps, the RTG felt a lagging interest by Western countries. Their 
greatest fear was that the refugees would stay in Thailand permanently. In April and May 
1979, the Thais instituted a push-back policy to physically prevent any refugees from 
coming into Thailand. 89 Those that tried to come by sea were also pushed back, drowned, 
or held in detention centers with minimum standards of humanitarian assistance. 
The Thais were soundly condemned by Western governments and the media. The 
Thai press criticized the West for not accepting more refugees. Spurred by the callous 
actions of the Thais, the first Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees met in July 
1979. This UN conference was attended by sixty-five countries including the Soviet 
Union. They pledged more than "$160 US million and twenty countries agreed to resettle 
260,000 refugees. "90 The RTG was successful in regaining Western commitment. 
By 1980, Laos was critically dependent on foreign aid. The LDPR had also 
reversed its policies of collectivized agriculture. Despite this, many Laos sought relief 
from one of the poorest economies in the world. The Thais shifted away from resettlement 
as a durable solution to repatriation. Laos was the first government to broker a 
repatriation program with the UNHCR. 
89Long, Ban Vinai, 41. 
~bid., 42. 
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However, prior to 1989, the repatriation programme had not 
been very successful and with the exception of 1987 when 
there were 1,069 returnees, the annual number of returnees 
during the period 1980-1988 had been less than 300. 91 
Unlike the Cambodians or Vietnamese, even the UNHCR in Bangkok felt Laotians 
were motivated by the lure of economics and resettlement opportunities. Persecution 
under the Protocol was not readily apparent in their claims for asylum. The new 
government under General Prem Tinsulanonda was even more impatient to discourage 
further refugee inflows. (The recession in Thailand forced the Kriangsak regime to resign 
in 1980.) Partially as a result of UNHCR recommendations, the concept of "humane 
deterrence" came into being. 92 
The Bangkok office of the UNHCR and UNHCR headquarters disagreed in the 
methods for discouraging Laotians seeking asylum. Previous attempts had failed at any 
comprehensive screening programs. UNHCR Bangkok fmally suggested that new arrivals 
would not automatically be screened for resettlement. The Volags activities would also 
be curtailed. 93 This was to accomplish several things. The lowered possibilities for 
resettlement was to discourage the Lowland Laos from exiting. Unlike the Hmong, they 
were not the target of discriminatory or retaliatory policies by the ruling government. 
Additionally, Volags were often more enthusiastic in helping the refugees than the 
indigenous population. The local population often fared under worse conditions than the 
refugees in the camps. At the height of the refugee crisis, the Committee for Coordination 
91 Chantavanich et al., I aotian Returnees in the Voluntary Repatriation Programme, 16. 
92Dennis McNamara, "Humane Deterrence in South-east Asia," in Gil Loescher and 




of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) recorded fifty-two Volags 
working in refugee camps all over Thailand. 94 
This concept of "humane deterrence" was quickly absorbed and modified by the 
RTG. In an ironic twist, "humane deterrence" was anything but humane. The Thai 
National Security Council announced in July 1981 that camps would be consolidated 
despite the overcrowded conditions that would surely result. The Thai Ministry of Interior 
was responsible for execution of these policies that included restricting resettlement 
opportunities, decreased rations, and renewed attempts to refuse entry into Thailand. 95 
Reaction was mixed in the United States. As the primary country of theird 
resettlement, the U.S. government did not want to institutionalize refugee immigration. 
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy cautiously 
endorsed "humane deterrence" as a "new approach" to dealing with Indochinee refugee 
flows. 96 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sheppard Lowman was more candid, "in spite 
of difficulties, we have encouraged the Thai in this intitiative [of humane deterrence]. "97 
The NGOs that worked in the refugee camps did not support the Thai policies but did not 
have much recourse. Whether or not humane deterrence was actually responsible for the 
decreased numbers of refugees, or other factors caused the reduced flows, the statistics 
reflect its intent. 98 The Thais would like to credit their policy, but it was worth noting that 
economic and political conditions also improved in Laos. By the end of 1982, the 
numbers dropped by over 15,000 from the previous year. 
94Long, Ban Vinai, 45. 
95McNamara, "Humane Deterrence in South-east Asia," 127. 
96Long, 48. 
97McNamara, 128. 
98Robert P. DeVecchi, "Politics and Policies of 'First Asylum' in Thailand," in World 
Refugee Report--1982 (Washington, D.C.: USCR/ANCS, 1982), 22. 
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E. THE THIRD WAVE (1982-1986) 
This period marked the greatest numbers of Laotian refugees drawn to the Thai 
refugee camps in hopes of resettlement. By this time, many had been resettled in the West 
and former refugees were sponsoring relatives. It was also marked by a stalemate quality 
resulting from all the refugee-receiving states' growing reluctance to accept more refugees 
and the attraction of emigration to the West for the poverty-stricken Laotians. Neither the 
UNHCR nor Thailand felt the stable population of about 55,000 Laotian Hilltribes and 
Lowlanders would easily disappear. Humanitarian assistance, mostly funded by the West 
was not decreasing. In 1981, UNHCR alone had contributed over $68 US million to 
Thailand for overall refugee relief. By December 1982, the resettlement countries had 
accepted more a total of 1,214,659 Indochinese (Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese) 
refugees. The United States alone granted asylum to 616,778 refugees. 99 
The RTG maintained pressure on the United States and other asylum countries to 
continue providing resettlement quotas and paying for the humanitarian assistance efforts 
within Thailand. U.S. politicians reflected the divided American citenzry's opinon on 
assisting Southeast Asian refugees. There was a growing domestic backlash against all 
refugees, not just the ones from Southeast Asia. For those that supported generous 
immigration policies felt we had a moral obligation to continue offering permanent 
asylum. Senator Mark 0. Hatfield from Oregon emphasized Thailand as an important ally 
in a critical area of the world. We were still heavily engaged in the Cold War and 
Southeast Asia was one of many theatres. U.S. refugee policy was a tool of diplomacy 
towards Thailand. It helped maintain good relations with a non-Communist country while 
99Zarjevski, A Future Preserved, 190. 
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serving as a base of operations for locating Missing-in-Action (MIAs) and counter-
narcotics enforcement in the "Golden Triangle" of Burma and Laos. 100 
UNHCR backed repatriation as the best durable solution for the Laotians. 
However, many Hmong did not want to return for fear of reprisals for participating in the 
insurgency movements. They wanted to go back to Laos only under "pre-1975" 
conditions. The Low landers preferred the refugee camps and hopes of resettlement over 
eking out a living in the LDPR. In 1983, "humane deterrence" had been lifted although 
the policies did not alter dramatically. In 1985, a more stringent and formal screening 
process was set up by the UNHCR. Criteria for being accepted as a refugee were: 
- forn1er civil servants, soldiers and policemen of the government 
who were employed prior to the revolution in Laos; persons who 
worked for embassies, international organizations of foreign 
private companies prior to the revolution in Laos. 
- persons who participated in political, administrative or social activities 
deemed to be antagonistic to the present Laotian Government; persons 
who have direct relatives in third countries, i.e., father, mother, son 
and daughter101 
Part of the initial failure of the Voluntary Program (instituted in 1980) was the 
inability of the LDPR regime or the UNHCR to convince returnees to repatriate. Many 
Hilltribes looked towards their leaders in making decisions. Rumors were rift that 
returnees were killed or detained by the government. The Lowlanders simply wanted to 
wait for resettlement. The Thais were extremely anxious to be rid of them. By the end 
of this period, they had hosted large populations for over a decade. 
1~ark 0. Hatfield, "U.S. Refugee Policy and Southeast Asia: time for a renewed 
commitment," in World Refugee Survey--1984 (Washington D.C.: USCR/ANCS, 1984), 29. 
101 Chantavanich et al., The I ao Returnees in the Voluntary Repatriation Programme, 
21. Stated in The Public Affairs Foundation, Indochinese Refugees in Thailand· prospects for 
longstayers (Bangkok: Innomedia, 1989), 29. 
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F. 1986-PRESENT 
During this period, only a small number (approx 4,500) of Hilltribe Lao were 
recognized as refugees by the UNHCR and Thailand in 1986 and 1988. Overall, push 
factors within Laos had decreased significantly. Collectivized agriculture was abandoned 
and most of the Vietnamese advisors returned to Vietnam. Relations between Laos and 
Thailand warmed as the Thais shifted to a more moderate stance on the refugees from 
push-backs and humane deterrence. In 1988, the Thai Secretary General of the National 
Security Council announced a softer stance of its policies: 
Thailand will continute to provide assistance to refugees, in 
accordance with humanitarian principles and in conjunction 
with the preservation of our sovereignty, national interest and 
national security. Refugees will be allowed to seek temporary 
refuge in Thailand while they await resettlement in third 
countries or repatriation to their respective countries of origin. 
The Royal Thai Government does not have the policy of allowing 
refugees to permanentnly settle in Thailand. 102 
In 1989-90, the RTG, LDPR, and UHNCR engaged in the Tripartite Meetings 
which reflected improving relations between the two countries. The voluntary repatriation 
program which had been in effect officially since 1980 began to be implemented in 
earnest. 103 The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that resulted from the Second 
Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees in June 1989 also contributed to providing 
durable solutions for the remaining refugees. The governments of both refugee-receiving 
102Chantavanich et al., The I ao Returnees in the Voluntary Rq>atriation Programme 
from Thailand, 21. Statement made at the 1988 CCSDPT Conference in Bangkok by Suwit 
Suthanakul, Secretary General of the National Security Council. 
103Ibid., 33. 
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and refugee-generating countries endorsed screening procedures for refugees, voluntary 
repatriation, and resettlement for all the refugees in Thailand. 104 
The RTG was determined to be rid of all refugees by the end of 1994 although this 
seems improbable at present. The "Outline of the Plan for a Phased Repatriation and 
Reintegration of Laotians in Thailand" from the Tripartite meetings clearly plan to close 
down the camps and send the Laotians back home. Secretary General Suwit Suthanukul 
made this evident to Representative Foglietta of the Committee on Foreign Affairs during 
a fact-finding mission in July 1991. 105 In October 1993 at the 44th meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the UNCHR in Geneva, the present Thai Secretary General 
Charan Kunlawanit relayed problems in repatriating the remaining 33,000 Lao refugees. 
Among problems cited were subversive activities against the government by some refugee-
warriors and the difficulties in absorbing and reintegrating the refugees into society. 106 
Fueled perhaps by the end of the Cold War and the LPRP' s recognition that foreign 
aid and an open market economy is the only hope for Laos' development, the root 
problems of Laotians refugee generation are slowly being resolved. The UNHCR and 
other NGOs are actively engaged within Laos. Current development projects include 
"construction and equipping of schools and dispensaries; the construction or repair of 
irrigation, reservoirs, canals and water-gates; the provision of tools, seeds and other inputs 
104Foglietta, "Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Laos: prospects for resettlement and 
repatriation," 3. 
1051bid., 7. 
106Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS)-WEU-93-1 Daily Report 13 October 
1993, "Thai Official Views Refugee Policy at UNHCR Meeting," Bangkok Radio Thailand 
Network. 10 October 1993. 
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for agriculture; and the provision of equipment, teaching aids and scholarships for 
vocational training for young urban returnees. "107 
Despite the remaining numbers of Laotian refugees, the Hmong and Lowlanders 
are repatriating for two reasons. Many realize after being "screened out" as true refugees, 
chances for third-country resettlement are very slim. Additionally, conditions in Laos 
including amnesty for those who renounce insurgency against the regime and slow but 
increased economic development are strong pull-factors for people who have been housed 
in refugee camps for over a decade. For Hmong, especially, who are inclined to follow 
the edicts of their clan leaders, there are doubts that Laos will ever return to the ways of 
"pre-1975." This recurring wish is becoming a dying dreams as hopes for toppling the 
__ Communists seem unlikely. The Lowlanders, who do not have the political or ethnic 
enmity against the current government, are being retrained for jobs required for a market 
economy. The LPDR government wants to attract foreign investment and tourism. 108 
Approximately 18,000 Lao refugees remained in Thailand by the end of September 
1994. Although most recognize they must return to Laos, there have been incidents of 
refusal by remaining refugees. The Thai Interior Ministry, the responsible agency for the 
overall refugee program, has alternated between cajoling and threats to repatriate or 
resettle the longstayers. Threats have included cutting off money from overseas relatives 
and moving remaining refugees to other parts of Thailand without UNHCR or NGO 
access. Deputy Permanent Interior Secretary Chaloem Phromloet gave a deadline of 30 
September 1994 for refugees to sign-up for the repatriation program. For the refugees that 
comply, this means an assistance package including money, necessities, and food. After 
the deadline, they would be treated as illegal immigrants and treated accordingly. One 
107Chantavanich et al., The I ao Returnees in the Voluntary Repatriation Programme 
from Thailand, 19. 
108Ibid. 
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hindrance to this repatriation policy has been resistance among the longstayer leaders who 
have persuaded their fellow refugees to resist repatriation. 109 They still hope for third-
country resettlement. 
For the refugees that do go back to Laos, there are welcoming ceremonies attended 
by representatives of the UNHCR, RTG, and LDPR. They are given time to acclimate 
in the reception centers before being transported along with an assistance package to their 
designated province. Once in Laos, the refugees are subject to the laws of the Laotian 
government. There have not been any widespread reports of human rights abuses for the 
returning refugeese. 110 
The LDPR and RTG governments are working closely in new economic ventures. 
Tourism is an expanding area of the Lao economy with the opening of Laos to foreign 
visitors in 1989. Other joint ventures include a special economic zone in Vientiane111 and 
the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (fmanced by the Australians), the first bridge to span the 
Mekong River that was orginally planned to be built thirty years ago. The RTG views the 
economic potential of closer relations with their traditional former enemy as good for 
Thailand. Foreign investment in Laos is on the rise, with Thailand being its biggest 
investor. 112 For the 4.4 million Laos, in one of the poorest countires in the world, a 
lasting peace has improved their lot from the days of the Indochinese wars. 
109FBIS-EAS-94-174 Daily Report 5 September 1994, "Lao Refugees Urged to Join 
Repatriation Plan," Nation (Bangkok), 5 September 1994, p. 8. 
11
'Human rights groups like Amnesty International, Asia Watch, and USCR regularly 
send reports of human rights violations from Burma and Cambodia (mainly Khmer Rouge), 
but Laos and Vietnam have a vested interest in promoting a successful voluntary repatriation 
program to the international community. 
111FBIS-EAS-94-150 Daily Report 4 August 1994, "Economic Zone Agreement Signed 
with Thai Firm," Vientiane Times, 15-21 July 1994, pp. 1, 8. 
112Gordon Fairclough, "Spanning the Divide," Far Eastern Fconomic Review 21 April 






From 1975 to 1994, more than 360,000 Laotians have sought refuge in Thailand. 
There is little doubt that the first wave of refugees were true victims of persecution from 
the newly formed Communist regime. Of the latter waves, there is little doubt that 
economics was the push factor rather than political persecution that drove them across the 
Mekong River into Thailand. 113 Push factors including re-education camps and a 
plummeting socialized economy were exacerbated by the instability of the insurgency 
movements within Laos. Rather than live under such impoverished conditions, the 
Laotians viewed life in the refugee camps to be prefereable to living in Laos. 114 
Thai reaction to the influx has wavered from benign tolerance, to humane 
deterrence, to voluntary repatriation. For a country inundated by more than one million 
Indochinese refugees, feelings of impatience and frustration against them are not 
unwarranted. The Thais have been justly criticized and praised for their alternating 
refugee policies. Of the three Indochinese refugee groups, the Laotians received the best 
reception because of the ethnic similarities and bilateral relations between Bangkok and 
Vientiane. 
At this juncture, the international community including the UNHCR and countries 
of resettlement are anxious for the Laotian camps to close their doors for a fmal time. 
Since the Thais adamantly refused permanent asylum to the refugees, the durable solutions 
of voluntary repatriation and resettlement are the only answers. Since the stability of the 
LDPR government has been established with renewed economic vigor and warming 
113Nakavachara and Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," 273. 
114In an intenriew with Craig Etchison, executive director of the Campaign to Oppose 
the Return of the Khmer Rouge, July 1994, Washinton, D.C., he reported of widespread 
communication from the Laotian refugee camps to relatives and friends back in Laos. The 
message was clear. Life in the refugee camps were better than living conditions in Laos. This 
was a clear pull factor in the rise in refugees during the second wave. 
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relations with foregin investors, the remaining longstayers no longer have a "well-founded 
fear" of persecution. Those that wait too long for a better option will lose out in the end. 
The RTG itself has undergone many changes in the past two decades. Several 
coups and coup attempts, a thriving economy, and a growing democracy movement have 
also changed the character of Thai rule. The refugee situation is a diminishing threat to 
national security threat. Despite the harshness with which the Thais reacted against the 
"illegal immigrants" from Laos, they have emerged through the crisis without any major 
domestic upheavals directly related to the refugee crises. Economics was both a push and 
pull factor with the Lowland Lao. It was widely believed by the RTG, UNCHR, and U.S. 
observers that the refugees during the second wave were economic migrants. 
Thailand has taken a pragmatic approach to its communist neighbors in Laos. As 
socialist regimes become open to Western-style open market economies, we should not be 
deterred from investing in those countries. With the end of the Cold War, Castro's Cuba 
is no longer a threat to the sovereignty of the United States. The voice of a small but 
powerlul lobby group from Cuban expatriates should not direct our foreign policy. Let 
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IV. THAILAND AND CAMBODIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the relationship between the Royal Thai Government, Cambodian 
refugees and the politics of international relief will be explored. When examining this 
relationship, there are several factors that distinguish its dynamics from the other refugee 
crises of Laos or Vietnam. The Cambodian crisis was borne of politics rather than 
economic or social reasons. It also produced the largest number of refugees on Thailand's 
borders. The crisis of Cambodia had far reaching regional and international 
ramifications. 115 
The backdrop of the Vietnamese invasion effected a regional crisis involving not 
only Thailand but the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). On the state level, the invasion heightened age-old interstate tensions between 
the Vietnamese and Thais. Cambodia under Hanoi's influence, long seen as a buffer state 
between the two countries, became a new source of threat to the national security of the 
RTG. ASEAN, formed by anti-Communist, open market economy states felt threatened 
by the aggression of Vietnam. The United States, China, and the Soviet Union provided 
the behind-the- scenes support for the ideological struggle. Amidst these state players, the 
individual leaders that dominated the political picture not only exacerbated the refugee 
crisis, but were personally responsible. 
Another factor unique to the Cambodian crisis was the politicization of 
humanitarian aid. Because the refugees included guerrilla factions of the Khmer Rouge 
that relied heavily on international aid, there were moral, ethical, and political dilemmas 
115The name Kambuja was given to the kingdom by Jayarvarman IT. The French 
version was Cambodge, or Cambodia in English. Under the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese-
backed Communists, it was renamed Kampuchea. Cambodia has always been the favored 
name by anti-Communists and is the name presently used by the coalition government in 
Phnom Penh. 
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facing the donor aid countries and agencies. Added to this melee were the Thai military 
factions and Vietnamese-backed government in the People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK) that skimmed humanitarian aid into their pockets. 
As background for understanding the roots of the Cambodian crisis, it will be 
necessary to give an historical account of the players and events that precipitated and 
continued the migration of almost 400,000 Cambodians across Thailand's borders. 
Figuring prominently throughout the crisis is Prince Sihanouk, the controversial but highly 
charismatic leader of the Camlxxlian people. Other key players are Pol Pot of the Khmer 
Rouge, the Vietnamese-backed leader Heng Samrin, president of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea and its prime minister, Hun Sen. The Thai military is a prominent component 
of this analysis. They were often at odds with other factions of the RTG and the 
international community that further complicated the existing political turmoil surrounding 
the future of Cambodia. Politics, therefore, was the greatest obstacle for the Thai 
government in resolving the refugee crisis. 
As for the refugees, large numbers of internally displaced people were generated 
with the fall of the Lon Nol government in 1975 and subsequent takeover by the Khmer 
Rouge. The refugees that fled during this first wave relatively small until the invasion by 
the Vietnamese in 1978. The majority were trapped within Cambodia. The refugee crisis 
on the Thai-Cambodian border lasted until1993 when the refugees were repatriated as the 
conclusion to the Paris Peace Accords of 1989. The Cambodian elections monitored by 
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) resulted in a fragile 
coalition government. Since the UN-brokered elections, the coalition government has tried 
to foster peace among the factions and rebuild a country devastated by decades of civil 
war. Although it is a country rich in human and natural resources, it is merely speculation 
whether Cambodia will ever return to its former glory or sustain its fragile peace. For 
neighboring Thailand, maintaining stability on its eastern flank is a major national security 
concern. 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUl't'D 
The kingdom of Cambodia reached its cultural and political zenith during the 
Angkor period (A.D. 802-1431). With the temple city complex of Angkor Wat as its 
cultural center, the Khmer people built an empire rivaling its neighbors. This golden age 
went into precipitous decline as the Thais spread into its western borders. This marked 
a long struggle for independence and sovereignty as Cambodia became the center of a 
power struggle between the Thais and Vietnamese. Although the Thais and Khmer shared 
a common culture, the invading Thais were cruel and repressive to their vassals. They 
wanted loyalty and tribute. The Vietnamese viewed them as barbarians to be conquered 
and subjugated. As a result, the fear of racial extinction in Cambodian thought persisted 
throughout the history of Cambodia, especially with the invasion of Vietnamese in 1978. 116 
During the French Colonial Period (1887-1953), the French contributed to the 
eventual sovereignty of Cambodia. The preservation of Khmer culture and identity had 
been threatened by the forced relocation of thousands of its populace to Thailand until 
Thailand itself became threatened by Western imperial presence. The French restoration 
of Angkor Wat lead to a renewed awakening of the Cambodian cultural conscience. 117 
Under French rule, a series of cooperative monarchs that served as religious patron 
figureheads were installed. The power was vested in the French-controlled bureaucracy. 
Even the mid-grade civil servants were Vietnamese, chosen over their Cambodian 
counterparts who comprised the lowest echelons. This lack of bureaucratic experience by 
Cambodians would add to the downfall of post-colonial governments. Cambodian 
monarchs were also left out of the ruling clique. Both elements of the modern state of 
Cambodia therefore did not have a tradition of governing. "A measure of the monarchs' 
116Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in Russell R. Ross, eel., Cambodia- a 
~ 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990), 9-15, 
117Ibid., 18-20. 
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status was the willingness of the French to provide them annually with complementary 
rations of opium. "118 
Upon King Sisowath Monivong Is (r.1927 -1941) death, the successor was his 
grandson, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The young prince would figure prominently in 
contemporary Cambodian politics. At nineteen years of age and educated at a French 
lycee in Saigon, he was chosen for his pliability. JJ9 
When the Japanese entered Cambodia, the neutralist Vichy French were allowed 
to remain as administrators. Educated Khmer elite became the most articulate of the 
nationalists and targeted both the French and Vietnamese in their vitriolic attacks. When 
the French returned after the surrender of the Japanese, Sihanouk began a campaign of 
nationalism and independence from the French for which he took full credit. As he 
consolidated power and paved the way for one-party rule, (himself), he abdicated the 
throne to his father, Prince Suramarit in 1955. As a "private citizen", Sihanouk amended 
the constitution and assumed the leadership of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum or People Is 
Socialist Community. 120 
S ihanouk Is popularity peaked in 1962 as he maintained a non-aligned stance 
towards the United States, accepted large power patronage from the Chinese, favored a 
domestic "Royal" or "Buddhist" style socialism, and encouraged cronyism. In the 1960s, 
many Cambodian expatriates returned. Included in this group was Saloth Sar, a thirty-two 
year old schoolteacher who would later call himself Pol Pot. By 1963, signs of unrest 
challenged Sihanouk 1 S one-man rule. He blamed the United States for encouraging plots 
ll
8Seekins, "Historical Setting," Cambodia, 18. 
119Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 344. 
12Thid., 375-6. 
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for his overthrow which lead to his refusal of further U.S. military aid in 1963. 
Diplomatic relations were cut off in 1965. 121 
Conditions inside Cambodia were ripe for a radical change. Sihanouk's primary 
obsession became film-making with himself as the star as the economy crumbled around 
him. The growing disparity between the intellectuals and peasantry polarized the political 
parties. On the left was the nascent communist groups. "Between 1963 and 1970 his 
policy of state-sponsored terror involving widespread arrests and executions of suspected 
dissidents led hundreds of students and professionals to join the communist guerrillas in 
the jungle." On the right were corrupt wealthy businessmen and pro-Western intellectuals 
who profited enonnously from the peasantry. In 1967, forces quelled an insurgency in the 
Battambang province. The deaths of more than ten thousand peasants lead to further 
converts for the Communist party. 122 
In March 1970, Lon Nol and other right-wingers orchestrated a coup against 
Sihanouk in absentia. Sihanouk, self-exiled to Beijing, countered by announcing a 
coalition government and denouncing the coup as another CIA plot against him. 123 
Although the extent of direct CIA involvement is widely disputed, the U.S. government 
121Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 377. 
122Michael Vickery, Kampuchea- politics, economics, and society (Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner Publications, 1986), 18. 
123Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War with the CIA (London: Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1973), 75. Sihanouk, in an attempt to remain neutral and keep his 
country from being engulfed in war, had reopened diplomatic negotiations with the United 
States in 1969. He had allowed the North Vietnamese to have bases within the Cambodian 
border, but tacitly condoned U.S. bombing of these bases. Lon Noland his supporters 
depended heavily on American aid. Sihanouk had rejected U.S. overtures for using 
Cambodia as a base of operations against the North Vietnamese. In this book, Sihanouk is 
quick to blame everyone else for the failings of his government but himself. The question of 
CIA involvement has provoked years of debate. The presence of the CIA in Cambodia is not 
disputed, merely its direct involvement in the coup. 
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was quick to support Lon Nol. U.S. military assistance totaling over $180 US million 
flowed into Cambodia. 124 
Lon Nol' s five year rule was plagued by a protracted civil war between his 
republican army and the Communists. Sihanouk had formed an alliance of convenience 
with the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) although he knew his life was expendable 
in their hands. The KCP was headed by Kieu Samphan, Pol Pot, and Ieng Sary. 
Sihanouk was aware that the KCP was merely using him. In an interview with the Italian 
journalist, Oriana Fallaci, Sihanouk is reported to have said: 
[I am] 100 percent with the Khmer Rouge .. .I am useful to 
them because without them they wouldn't have the peasants, 
and you can't make a revolution in Cambodia without the 
peasants. 125 
Over three million internal Khmer refugees were displaced as the two sides fought 
a protracted and costly civil war. Hundreds of thousands were killed, maimed, or made 
homeless. 126 Despite heavy American support for the Lon Nol forces, there was little 
optimism for neither a negotiated settlement nor a government victory. When the Khmer 
Rouge rolled into Phnom Penh on 17 April1975, the Cambodians who greeted them with 
relief were quickly stripped of their enthusiasm. "People began to realize that, in the eyes 
of the victors, the war was not over; it was just beginning, and the people were the new 
enemy. rr127 
124David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), 211. 
1251bid., 228-9. Reported in the New York Times Magazine, 12 August 1973 
describing the interview with Oriana Fallaci in May 1973. 
126Neil Davis, "The Cambodian Conflict," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 January 
1975, p. 14. 
127Seekins, "Historical Setting," Cambodia, 48. 
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Khmer Rouge enter Phnom Penh. 34,000 refugees flee to 
Thailand between 1975-78. 
Vietnamese invasion drives Khmer Rouge and their hostage 
population of 100,00 to the Thai border. UNHCR offers 
assistance to the RTG. No response. 
Total of 3,500 more refugees into Thailand. RTG closes 
its borders. 
Incident at Preah Vihear kills thousands of refugees. 
Thai military behind it. 
Vietnamese attacks on Khmer Rouge drive 100,000 more 
refugees into Thailand. 
Thailand opens Khao I Dang Holding Center. By May 1980, 
there are over 130,000 Cambodians. 
Thailand closes borders for second time. New arrivals 
must enter resistance bases inside Thailand. 
Plan for "mass repatriation" announced by the RTG. 
Vietnamese forces attack a Thai village. 
UNHCR establishes offices in Phnom Penh for repatriation 
of 360,000 people from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
The UN Border Relief Program is established. 
The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea is 
formed between Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, and Son Sann. 
Vietnamese attacks of Khmer Rouge/resistance camps drive 
230,000 civilians permanently into Thailand. 
Phnom Penh and UNHCR sign agreement on voluntary 
repatriation. 
UNHCR designated lead agency for repatriations. 
Paris Peace Conference. All four sides reach consensus 
on voluntary repatriation. 
UN Peace Plan for Cambodia signed. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by UNHCR, 
Thailand, and Cambodia. 
First repatriation begins. 
Last Cambodian refugee camp officially closes. 
UN sponsored elections. 
Sihanouk signs new constitution as elected head of new 
coalition government. 
World Food Program rations come to an end for final group 
of returnees. 
Khmer Rouge still want people to takeover government. 
Rejects peace overtures. 
Source: Compiled from USCR, "Something Like Home Again", May 1994. 
Table 4. Chronology of Cambodian Refugees 
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C. THE POL POT YEARS (1975-1978) 
Much has been written about the Khmer Rouge and its incredulous barbarity against 
its own people since the invasion of the Vietnamese in 1978. The atrocities depicted in 
news documentaries like "The Killing Fields" tell a gruesome story of how a fanatical 
leader and his followers nearly exterminated half the population of the Khmer people. 
In 1979 Thailand was the first nation to recognize the Khmer Rouge as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia, or Democratic Kampuchea (OK). Although the RTG 
was emphatically anti-Communist, the Khmer Rouge was of strategic importance. "As 
often in the past, the Thais saw the Vietnamese as a greater threat than the Khmers, a race 
whom the Thais have traditionally seen as a buffer against Vietnam. "128 The flow of 
refugees from Indochina spurred the RTG into normalizing relations with its governments. 
The Khmer Rouge were very effective in keeping their population from crossing the 
borders. They kept tight control over the approximately seven million Cambodians alive 
during this period. 129 Estimates of refugees range from thirty to fifty thousand that crossed 
into Thailand. According to UNHCR figures, about thirty thousand refugees were allowed 
temporary asylum by the RTG. 130 Another 150,000 fled to Vietnam. 
The fust wave of refugees into Thailand were mostly from Laos. The Cambodians 
were significantly less in comparison. The RTG, UNHCR, and other Volags had set up 
fifteen refugee camps, jointly operated, but mostly funded by the international community. 
The Thais felt the situation was manageable and would eventually be repatriated or 
128William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 
129Seekins, "Historical Setting," Thailand, 217. 
130Josephine Reynell, Political Pawns· refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean border 
(Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1989), 31. Exact figures from the UNHCR place them 
at 34,039 according to Nakavachara and Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," 272-3. 
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resettled. 131 When Kriangsak came to power, the policy of "humane deterrence" changed 
the Thai position. 
D. TilE PEAK (1979-1981) 
The Vietnamese Army invaded Democratic Kampuchea on Christmas Day of 1978 
and captured Phnom Penh by 7 January. At the time of this unheralded move against 
another communist country, speculations surrounding this maneuver ran rampant. 
Although Hanoi claimed it wanted to stop the atrocities being committed by the Khmer 
Rouge, a more likely contributing factor was the interstate conflict caused by the order 
incursions by the Kinner Rouge into Vietnamese claimed territory. When Pol Pot's forces 
came to power, they grouped everyone into two categories, "the new people" and "the old 
people." The new people comprised of intellectuals and supporters of former regimes. 
Anyone with glasses or ties to the bourgeoisie were targeted. 132 As part of their master 
plan to rebuild a new society resplendent in past Angkorian glory, a fanatical and grossly 
miscalculated plan of emptying the urban areas relocating people to the countryside while 
destroying remnants of Westernization ended in the near genocide of the Khmer people. 
People died from hunger, disease, purges, and brutality. Death estimates range from one 
to one and a half million people. 133 
The atrocities of the Khmer Rouge did not concern the Vietnamese so much as their 
territorial claims to land within the Vietnamese border along the Mekong River. Although 
the Kinner Rouge had received Viet Minh support during their early years, this had been 
done out of political necessity rather than a shared ideological affinity. Once in power, 
131 Seekins, "Historical Setting," Thailand, 115-6. Between 1975-1978, official Thai 
figures estimate approximately 228,200 Indochinese refugees were within their borders. 
132USCR, Cambodians in Thailand· people on the edge (Washington D.C.: 
USCR/ANCS, 1985), 4. 
133Reynell, Political Pawns, 28. 
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the DK Communists refused to acknowledge gratitude to the Vietnamese. Attempts by 
Hanoi to normalize relations were rejected. Ethnic Vietnamese who had been living in 
Cambodia for centuries were pushed back. Also alarming were the Khmer Rouge 
overtures to Beijing. 134 The extreme ethnonationalism encouraged by the Khmer Rouge 
is not surprising. It has been a recurring theme for the Vietnamese to be considered as 
"savages" and "villains" for their historic exploitation of its people. 135 
In the year prior to the fall of Phnom Penh, Hanoi officials had publicly 
discounted direct invasion as a means to weaken the Khmer Rouge. After the action, there 
was general agreement from regional observers that the move was calculated and long in 
planning. The lure of annexing Cambodia was too great, " ... like a gambler maddened by 
one loss after another, the Vietnamese authorities have decided to throw in all their stakes 
and overrun Kampuchea so as to lay the cornerstone for their future great empire. "136 
The RTG perspective in January 1979 reflected uncertainty. Although the 
Vietnamese had assured Bangkok that an invasion of Thailand was not in their interests, 
skepticism was warranted. Prior to the new government in Phnom Penh, the Thais had 
been on the path to normalizing relations with all the Indochinese neighbors. The Thai 
military knew they were not ready to engae in a successful military conflict against the 
battle-hardy Vietnamese. Arms and military hardware purchases from the United States 
increased dramatically. 137 The greatest threat to Thailand's strategic security was the 
prestige it would lose in the region. Vietnam's continued influence in the region was 
134USCR, Cambodians in Thailand· people on the e.dge, 4. 
135Nayan Chanda, "The Black Book of Hatred," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 
January 1979, p. 19. 
136Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia: Fifteen Day That Shook Asia," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 19 January 1979, p. 13. Quoted from the Peking People's Daily. 
137Richard Nations, "Thailand prepares to think of the unthinkable," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 2 February 1979. 
64 
~----------------------------------
spreading, not only in Laos but also in Cambodia. Thailand did not want to play a 
subordinate role on the Southeast Asian mainland. 138 Nor did Bangkok want to give 
indications it wanted to engage militarily with Hanoi. Instead, the Thais played big power 
diplomacy with ASEAN as its bulwark. 
The tension that followed the invasion is also reflected in the international and 
regional shockwaves it produced. The superpowers did not want direct military 
involvement. Their support was funneled through military and humanitarian aid. Although 
Vietnam had attempted diplomatic overtures, the veterans lobby groups rejected any 
Congressional softening towards Hanoi. China felt Vietnamese aggression had to be 
halted, or "taught a lesson. "139 In February, the Chinese attacked Vietnam in a four week 
war to ease the pressure off the Khmer Rouge and Thai government as well as to prove its 
dominance in the region. However, the Chinese received more damage in that conflict. 
In 1979, secret negotiations with the Chinese and Thais had built the framework for 
material support of the Khmer Rouge. 140 In a strange and unlikely network of alliances, 
the U.S., Thailand, China, and the Khmer Rouge were united in the effort to oust Vietnam 
from Cambodia. 141 The Soviet Union, the other superpower in this proxy war, remained 
a close ally or staunch supporter of Vietnam until near the end of the Cold War. 
138Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-east Asia (London: Routledge, 
1989), 90. 
139Nayan Chanda, "Mustering For a Battle on the Border," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 16 February 1979. p.IO. 
140Uifer, 91. 
141Reynell, Political Pawns, 41. From 1979-1986, the United States gave the Khmer 
Rouge $85 US million dollars in economic and military assistance. The Congressional 
Research Service which provided these figures originally has since reported that these data are 
no longer available and that the person who gave the figures is not available. 
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At a foreign ministers' meeting of ASEAN, the group issued an uncharacteristically 
strong statement (by their standards) condemning the action by Hanoi: "What is happening 
nmv in the Indochina region is unfortunate and will not be conducive to the establishment 
of peace and stability in the region, which we all desire. "142 An editorial comment in the 
Singapore Straits Times left no doubt: 
This intervention of Vietnam, after oft-repeated professions of 
peaceful intentions, must earn for Hanoi the everlasting distrust 
of non-communist nations in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's part in 
contriving the fall of Phnom Penh deserves the universal con-
demnation of the world community, though with its Soviet ally at 
the United Nations nothing more than pious declarations are likely 
to be passed ... 143 
By January 1979, the RTG faced a human wave of over 100,000 refugees amassed 
on the Thai border. The threat to their national security prompted the turnover of refugee 
operations on the Thai-Cambodian border from the Ministry of the Interior to the Thai 
military. 144 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling sent the Thai Prime 
Minister a telegram offering UNHCR assistance. No response followed. 145 The RTG 
infonned the UNHCR's Bangkok office that the refugees were "illegal immigrants" of 
which loyalties were unknown. This was partially true. Many of the Khmer Rouge and 
their population had settled in encampments near the northwest corridor of Cambodia and 
Thailand. In March, Thailand closed its borders to refugees. Partial explanation for 
Kriangsak' s actions lay in the domestic problems that plagued his government. He was 
142Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN Unites in Anger," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 
January 1979, p. 13. Quoted from the Singapore Straits Times. 
143Ibid., p. 19. 
144Za.Ijevski, A Future Preserved, 191. 
145USCR, "Something I ike Home Again"· the repatriation of Cambodian refugees 
(Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1994), 3. 
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quickly losing his mandate as a result of a lackluster economy and rising factional tensions 
within the army and bureaucracy. 146 No doubt, he felt beleaguered by these domestic and 
international events. 
In another incident that was the climax of forced repatriations conducted by the 
Thai military, over 43,000 Cambodians were bussed from open fields to the cliffs of Preah 
Vihear. At gunpoint, they were told to cross back into Cambodia. Thousands were 
maimed or killed as they were pushed down the mountain paths and onto minefields. 
International furor resulted, but little action resulted. The UNHCR was heavily criticized 
for not intervening. Kriangsak and his government were pleased over the international 
attention. The U.S. government in Bangkok later acknowledged regret for its inaction. 
American pressure would have been the most likely to have effected the Thais. In defense 
of the UNHCR, it must be realized that the agency operates on the basis of neutrality. 
They do not have any jurisdiction over a sovereign government, but assists with their 
approval. 147 American Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, who later became a champion 
of the refugees said: 
We asked the Thais to stop. They refused. We took the 
view that if the government had been forced to stop in 
midstream, Kriangsak could have been brought down by 
the military. Also we hoped that the refugees would be able 
to get back. We didn't realize how awful the geography was. 148 
If the pushback was supposed to gamer international attention, it succeeded. 
Perhaps too well. The RTG' s objective was to pressure the West to increase their 
resettlement quotas. It was felt that the United States had caused the spillover effects of 
146Girling, Thailand, 223-5. 
147Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 88-91. 
148Ibid., 92. Quote by Morton Abramowitz, American Ambassador to Thailand. 
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a Communist victory in Hanoi and the refugees were by default, were the making of U.S. 
foreign policy. The coordinated humanitarian assistance between the UN, the United 
States, and other countries persuaded the Thais to move the refugees away from the border 
into refugee camps called "holding centers." Its causal effect was a pull factor, the 
possibility of resettlement to the West. 
Under the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese were not the 
"liberators" they claimed to be. The Cambodians were subject to imprisonment without 
trials, forced migration, and other human rights violations. 149 Because the invasion and 
subsequent fighting had upset the rice-planting cycle, the threat of a disastrous famine 
existed. Massive humanitarian aid from the Volags such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Oxfam UK, and many others eventually went to the PRK after months 
of stalling by Phnom Penh. 150 
Michael Vickery, a somewhat controversial Cambodian expert, describes the pull 
factors in the generation of the second wave of refugees (no order of importance): 
(1) to make contact with the outside world for the purposes of 
either going abroad or contacting relatives already abroad; 
(2) to trade across the border for commercial purposes; 
(3) to join, or organize, one of the para-military or bandit 
groups loosely called Khmer Serei, 'Free Khmer. t!SI 
149USCR, Cambodians in Thailand· people on the edge, 8. 
150Shawcross, 96. Cambodia has two main rice crops. The minor one is planted 
toward the end of the year and in the second in May before the monsoon seasons start. When 
the monsoon rains drop off, it is harvested in February and March. This is the dry season, 
also a time when military offensives are usually conducted by both warring sides. 
151Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, 29. 
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During this time, the Kriangsak government was heavily dominated by the military. 
Unlike the United States where there is a strong delineation of responsibilities and 
authority between the military and political bureaucracy, it is not the same in Thailand. 
The traditional road to power has been the military. The Thai people have viewed them 
as political purveyors, to be depended upon if and when political crises occur. Salaried 
officers do not receive much income from their military positions. For this reason, many 
enter private businesses. These often lucrative enterprises allow them to yield great 
influence in national affairs. 152 Power and money have been a cornerstone of the Thai 
military-political bureaucracy. 
Vietnamese aggression greatly worried the RTG. In October 1979, the PRK-
Vietnamese forces fighting Khmer Rouge/insurgency forces drove 100,000 people into 
Thailand. Following a visit to the border by Kriangsak, where he was witness to the 
horrible conditions along the border encampments, Thai refugee policy reversed itself. 
Possibly as a combination of humanitarian gesture and international pressure, the RTG 
allowed the UNHCR to open the Khao I Dang Holding Center. The UNHCR had a budget 
of $3 US million dollars. $500,000 US dollars went to the RTG as an "installment" to 
help Thailand. 153 This UNHCR operated camp did not contain Khmer Rouge supporters. 
Instead, most of these people were screened for resettlement to the United States. To 
152John B. Haseman, "The Armed Forces," Thailand· a country study, 246. This 
explains why military officers think nothing of lining their own coffers. Only since the 1980s 
has there been efforts at reform by the "Young Turks" in the military service. Enlisted 
personnel are conscripted. When the humanitarian agencies had to rely heavily on Thai 
military assistance to feed the refugees, Thai generals took their "share" of the aid packages. 
153Shawcross, The Qua1ity of Mercy, 174. 
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discourage the numbers of refugees, "post 1979" refugees were deemed ineligible for 
third-country resettlement. 154 
The RTG closed its border for the second time in January 1980. Asylum-seekers 
were told to stay on the border. This eventually led to the creation of eight "border 
camps" which were not controlled by the UNHCR unlike Khao I Dang which was an 
official center well within the Thai border. The refugees were called "displaced persons" 
and not granted prospects for asylum or resettlement. By May 1980, the population at the 
border had reached 130,000. In June, the Thais announced plans for a "mass repatriation" 
program. It was greatly feared that third-country resettlement could not keep pace with 
the arrivals. The RTG had no intentions of playing permanent host to Cambodian or any 
other Indochinese refugees. 155 
The "voluntary mass participation" spurred Vietnamese/PRK incursions into Thai 
territory in June 1980. Victims of this "voluntary mass" movement included 7,000 
refugees from the Khmer-Rouge controlled Sa Kaeo refugee camp that were moved back 
into Cambodian territory ostensibly to provide bodies for the resistance movemene 56 and 
provide battlefield porters. 
Vietnamese/PRK response was a shelled attack on a Thai village and some non-
Communist camps. This action into Thai territory affmned prior suspicions of Vietnamese 
aggression. The PRK viewed this UNHCR/RTG program as support for the resistance 
movement. Military retaliation for repatriation was supposed to discourage the movement 
154USCR, "Something I ike Home Again"· the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, 4. 
From 1975 to 1994, there were 232,000 Cambodian refugees resettled to fifteen countries of 
permanent asylum. Of that number, about 148,000 Cambodians settled in the United States. 
155Ibid., 8. 
156Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-east Asia, 107. 
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of Khmer Rouge-controlled forces back into Cambodia. 157 For the Thais and ASEAN, it 
was viewed and proclaimed as an unprovoked act. Prior to the Vietnamese attack, 
ASEAN members Indonesia and Malaysia did not publicly condemn the Hanoi 
government. With the crossover into Thai territory, there was no room for diplomatic 
equivocation. The Thais and along with ASEAN worked in concert to keep international 
pressures on the Vietnamese to withdraw. 158 Other effects from the incursion were the ban 
on humanitarian aid shipments into Phnom Penh through Thailand. 159 The Thais had tried 
to be neutral or at least not overtly antagonistic towards Phnom Penh, but all this changed. 
By the end of 1981 , the peak of Cambodians onto Thailand's borders dropped. The 
policy of "humane deterrence" (See Chapter 3) was working. The pull factors of their-
country resettlement and easier living conditions in the refugee camps were suspended. 
Despite the armed conflict that ensued with the first voluntary repatriation program, this 
became a "durable solution" endorsed by the UNHCR. Negotiations between UNHCR 
and the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh lead to more than 234,000 Cambodians 
repatriated back from Thailand. (UNHCR reported figures) USCR criticizes the UNHCR 
its inaccurate reporting. Part of the repatriation program included "resettlement kits" 
which provided material assistance to returnees. Figures were based on how many of the 
kits were handed out by the two-man resettlement office in Phnom Penh. USCR charges 
that there was no verifiable means of separating refugees from Thailand an internally 
displaced person in Cambodia. 160 
The peak of refugees had come in 1979 when approximately 200,000 Cambodians 
were driven across to the Thai border. In 1980, close to 100,000 more arrived. Most 
157Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-east Asia, 107 
158Haseman, "Government and Politics," Thailand· a country study, 219. 
159USCR, "Something I ike Home Again", 6. 
16Thid., 7. 
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remained at the Thai-Kampuchean border and were forced to take refuge in resistance 
movement camps. 161 It is important to note that not all the refugees were fleeing the PRK 
forces. As with many authoritarian regimes like the Khmer Rouge that are ousted, it is 
essential to have a population travel with them. Many refugees in the border encampments 
did not have a choice. The Khmer Rouge had forced them at gunpoint to travel with them. 
This refugee population gave them legitimacy as a government, conscripts for their army, 
porters at the battlefield to fight the political and military battle with the new government 
in Phnom Penh. 162 Most importantly, their population was the attraction of humanitarian 
aid from the international community. 
There were two dilemmas posed by assisting the Khmer Rouge population. The 
first were ethical and moral. It seemed ironic to be aiding the very regime that was 
responsible for the deaths of so many Cambodians. When the refugee crisis had started, 
an institutionalized border feeding program did not exist. The United Nations 
International Children's and Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) were providing an informally structured aid program. This was the 
second problem posed by the Khmer Rouge population. UNICEF and the Red Cross with 
other Volags were trying to negotiate an aid distribution plan inside Cambodia with Phnom 
Penh. The Cambodians were faced with a massive famine because the rice planting had 
been disrupted by war. Knowledge that the same Volags were feeding their enemies 
would have jeopardized the two-front relief effort. Media attention on the disastrous 
conditions of the Khmer Rouge populations prompted an international response that belied 
political revulsion of the Pol Pot forces. 
161 Nakavachara and Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," 272-3. 
162Interview with Craig Erickson, Executive Director of the Campaign to Oppose the 
Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR), 20 July 1994, Washington, D.C. 
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Daily, awful spindly creatures, with no flesh and with wide vacant 
eyes stumbled out of the forests and the mountains into which the 
Khmer Rouge had corralled them. They had malaria, they had 
tuberculosis, they had dysentery, they were dehydrated, they were 
famished, they were dying. In many cases, they were so badly 
starved that their bodies were consuming themselves. 163 
Besides the political problems at the border, UNICEF and the ICRC were faced 
with the distribution of food to the refugees and greedy Thai military officials who felt 
entitled to a cut of the aid. A close friend of the Prime Minister was Colonel Prachak 
Sawaengchit, the commander of the Royal Thai Army's Second Infantry Regiment. 
UNICEF had warehouses built to store the food and supplies that arrived by truck convoy. 
Prachak demanded regular payments in the way of a convoy every now and then. He 
would blackmail the relief agencies by denying them access to the camps and would 
threaten to close down the whole program. Any infrastructure built for the relief work 
was also billed to the Volags. Refugees at the border were in need of many items. Also 
at the border were Cambodian tradesmen that bought goods from Thais traders and sold 
them inside Cambodia. The Thai traders were "taxed" along the way by Prachak's forces. 
In this way, he and other corrupt army officials amassed personal fortunes from the border 
relief program. 164 
In 1 9 81 the World Food Programme took over the responsibilities of providing 
"food, water, shelter, and basic relief supplies in the border camps" previously done by 
UNICEF and the ICRC. In January 1982, their care became mandated under the UN 
163Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 170-1. 
164Ibid.' 233-7. 
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Border Relief Operation (UNBR0). 165 The border camps which totaled eight in number 
by the mid-1980s served to be of very strategic importance for Thailand. 
E. THE INTERIM (1982-1983) 
In 1982, as an ASEAN sponsored move, the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK) was established. For Thailand, China, ASEAN and 
Western governments opposed to the PRK government, it was a palatable measure that 
afforded them with an ethical means of publicly providing the resistance movements with 
military and material aid. "Dilution of the bestial reputation of the Khmer Rouge was 
paramount." 166 
To describe it as a coalition government is a misnomer. The CDGK leaders 
vehemently hated one another in private, but publicly refrained from dispelling the myth. 
The three components of the CDGK were lead by the erstwhile Prince Sihanouk with the 
French acronym of FUNCIPEC, or National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia. The second was under the Kinner Rouge. The third 
was the Kampuchean People National liberation Front (KPNLF) lead by Son Sann, a 
fonner cabinet minister under Sihanouk in the 1960s. 167 
The strategic and political benefits of forming the CDGK were numerous. For Pol 
Pot who was the true operator behind his front man, Khieu Samphan, it meant a 
resurgence of his political and military power. The aid that flowed to the border 
encampments not only gave the Khmer Rouge international legitimacy but enabled its 
forces to maintain the guerrilla war against the PRK. 168 Sihanouk was once again in the 
165USCR, "Something I ike Home Again" 7. 
166Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Srn1th-east Asia, 118. 
167Reynell, Political Pawns, 37. 
168Ibid. 
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limelight, playing the benevolent leader. Son Sann' s faction was the larger of the two 
non-Communist factions. His forces comprised the right-wingers that had supported Lon 
Nol. Sihanouk's attempt to merge the two non-communist coalitions was rejected by Son 
Sann. 169 Despite the absence of a constitution, headquarters, or viability without outside 
help. the CGDK was an important milestone in the history of the resistance movement. 
One of the reasons the Royal Thai Government allowed the border camps to exist 
stemmed from strategic considerations. The CGDK and its border camp populations 
served as a buffer against the encroaching Vietnamese/PRK forces. The resistance groups 
within the loosely formed government provided conscripts for the guerrilla war being 
waged inside Cambodia's border. Their strategic location on the border was vital to the 
movement. 
The continued support of these camps on the Thai-Kampuchean 
border can only be fully comprehended in relation to the strategic 
concerns of the regional governments and the governments of 
China and the United States ... The border has become an arena 
in which these interests are being played out; the issue at stake 
is the balance of power within Southeast Asia. 170 
If the camps had been moved further inland, Thai villagers would have suffered the same 
shelling and incursive attacks as the border camp populations. It would have invited 
Vietnamese aggression. 
There was another aspect of the difference in Thai policy toward the border camps 
versus Khao I Dang and other detention centers further within Thai territory. Prior to 
the consolidation of the CDGK which became autonomous political camps, the movement 
of people between the borders was rather fluid. Once the resistance groups became 
politicized, the Vietnamese mined the borders. Many inside the border camps who wanted 
16'1laseman, "Politics and Government," Cambodia· a country smdy, 201, 207. 
17~eynell, Political Pawns, 39. 
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to return to Cambodia or tried to get resettlement abroad could not. The refugee's mere 
presence in the camps meant automatic affiliation to the faction that controlled the camp. 
Security was handled by the Thai military and shared by the Khmer Rouge in their camps. 
The UNBRO was only responsible and authorized to provide food and shelter to the border 
people. The UNHCR was not allowed to operate there and could not give them any 
physical protection. This demarcation between "displaced persons" on the border and 
"asylum-seekers/refugees" in Khao I Dang was the difference in their treatment and 
prospects for third-country resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and even local resettlement 
which was granted to about 9,000 Cambodians of Thai descent. 171 
Site 8 Khmer Rouge 
Natro Khmer Rouge 
Ta Luan Khmer Rouge 
Borat Khmer Rouge 
Huay Chan Khmer Rouge 
---------+---------------------4 
Sok Sann KPNLF 
Site 2 KPLNF 
Greenhill Sihanouk 
Source: Reynell, Political Pawns, Map 1. 
Table 5. Border Camps and their Political Affiliation 
By the end of 1982, more than 1.2 million Indochinese refugees from all over 
Southeast Asia were resettled to third countries of asylum. The United States (616,778), 
China (262,853), France (86,640), Canada (85,139), and Australia (70,735) were the top 
171Court Robinson, "Refugee Protection in Thailand and the Closing of Khao I Dang," 
in USCR, World Refugee Survey--1986, (Washington, D.C.: USCR/ANCS, 1986), 54. 
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five host countries. These numbers did not include the refugees that were resettled from 
other Southeast Asian countries of first asylum. 172 Resettlement offers from the West 
continued to decline. The declining resettlement rates and "humane deterrence" kept the 
arrival numbers relatively low. As a result, the RTG reversed its policy of "humane 
deterrence" in 1983. 
F. THE THIRD WAVE (1984-1985) 
By this time, the reality of the refugee camps was disheartening to both the RTG 
and the people in the camps. More than 350,000 Indochinese refugees were living in 
squalid conditions without a political resolution in sight. To make matters worse for the 
Cambodian refugees living on the border, a new Vietnamese offensive in December 1984 
sparked a new exodus of refugees into Thailand. By 1985, more than 234,000 
Cambodians were crowded into Site 2, just inside Thai territory. The RTG treated them 
as temporary illegal immigrants and did not allow them to be screened for permanent 
resettlement abroad. 173 
The UNHCR/RTG program of voluntary repatriation was on hold. Despite the 
lifting of "humane deterrence" in 1983, there were reports of Cambodian asylum-seekers 
being pushed back across by border guards and police who were under orders from the 
government. 174 The Heng Samrin government was suspicious of returning refugees. Many 
were Khmer Rouge or other resistance forces disguised as repatriating refugees. 
172ZaJjevski, A Fumre Preserved, 190. 
173Long, Ban Vinai, 48-50. Although none of the refugees are afforded permanent 
asylum by Thailand, the refugees in Khao I Dang and detention centers have a chance to be 
interviewed by the UNHCR for resettlement. At one time, arrivals after 1979 were barred 
from the resettlement process. Though the Thais have reversed that policy, new arrivals, 
especially in the border camps are considered "illegals" and do not have resettlement 
prospects. 




From 1975 to 1985, Thailand was able to resettle eighty percent of its 650,000 
Indochinese refugees to countries of permanent asylum. Of that number, approximately 
seventy percent or 364,000 went to the United States. 175 
G. THEW AITING YEARS (1986-1991) 
Thailand was experiencing overall economic growth in the 1980s. With a six 
percent growth rate in 1987 with projections for steady growth to 1992, 176 the push for 
domestic development was of paramount concern to the Thais. In the Fifth Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1982-1986) promulgated by the Royal Thai Government's 
Permanent Subcommittee for Economic and Security Coordination, two of the four 
identified security threats to Thailand were (1) open military attacks by Vietnam and (2) 
refugees. The refugees "presented problems of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and 
espionage, in addition to being a fmancial and administrative burden for Bangkok. "177 
This was the first time the Thais had integrated defense requirements with economic and 
social development programs. The domestic pressures combined with the strategic and 
humanitarian concerns of the refugees proved to be extremely frustrating. 
Despite UN resolutions condemning Hanoi's presence in Cambodia and the refusal 
of most countries to acknowledge Heng Samrin's government as the legitimate power in 
Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese had no plans to withdraw of their own volition. The Khmer 
Rouge which had become a potent force again, thanks to the UN (primarily American) 
donors providing humanitarian assistance and the Chinese who gave them military aid, 
175Long, Ban Vinai, 51. 
176Court Robinson, "Refugee Protection in Thailand and the Closing of Khao I Dang," 
177Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Defence Spending and Threat Perception, II in 
Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1987), 87. 
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they posed a greater ethical dilemma than before. The RTG refused to consider the border 
camp inhabitants anything more than displaced persons. The humanitarian agencies were 
at the mercy of donor countries for fmancial support, the Thai military for the security, 
and the RTG for allowing the refugees to be housed on Thai territory. This continued the 
stalemate on the border. 178 
The pervasive threat of PRK/Vietnamese aggression and the presence of more than 
360,000 Indochinese refugees continued to pose national security risks for Thailand's 
government. But the border camps were especially vulnerable to the political and physical 
risks of all the players involved. On a strategic level, the supetpOwers continued to play 
a heavy role in the geopolitical picture. At the state level, the RTG's National Security 
Council continued to view the camps as a "buffer." The UNBRO and the numerous 
Volags that worked with the refugees were yet another level in the hierarchy. In the 
camps, the ruling CDGK faction controlled the everyday fate of the refugees. 179 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Border 260,000 270,000 311,000 300,000 326,000 370,000 
Interior 27,600 23,210 17,470 17,230 
*In 1990 and 1991, USCR combined the different "types" of refugees in Thailand. 
Source: USCR World Refugees Surveys 
Table 6. Population of Cambodian Refugees in Thailand 1986-1991. 
Of the three factions of the CDGK, the Khmer Rouge continued to operate with 
little regard for human rights. Many of the camp inhabitants were virtual prisoners of the 
Khmer Rouge. Some had been herded across the border to be their "population" while 
178Reynell, Political Pawns, 56. 
17~bid., 55. 
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others were the wives, children, and family of the soldiers. Many times, the soldiers were 
forcibly recruited. It was either join the resistance movement or suffer punishment, even 
execution. The Khmer Rouge had strict control over their population in their camps. The 
RTG did not and the UN/Volags could not often intervene against the abuses. 180 
In 1987, the UN and Volag people on the border were increasingly uneasy and 
frustrated that the Khmer Rouge soldiers controlled and benefited from the civilians within 
the camps. 
It is bad enough that a genocidal faction derives credibility and 
political validation from continued UN recognition as a member of 
the CDGK. It is appalling that the international community continues 
to provide aid to these mass murderers in the name of humanitarianism. 181 
The cost of maintaining the camps was about $36 US million dollars a year. By 
far, the United States was the greatest donor at thirty-three percent; Japan, twenty-eight 
percent, the EEC, eight percent; and Australia, two percent. Other counties and NGOs 
gave the remaining difference. China was the primary donor of military aid to the CDGK, 
particularly to the Khmer Rouge. The RTG provided nothing but camp security, land, and 
a willingness to maintain the camps at other countries' expenses. 182 
Part of the thirty-six million dollars went to the Mfected Thai Village Programme, 
which on paper was supposed to aid those local Thai villagers effected by the presence of 
the camps and the "border towns" which drove up market prices in the area. While it was 
a good idea in principle, it was largely suspected that a major portion of the money went 
into the coffers of the Thai military. Secondly, the food and supplies that went to the 
18~eynell, Political Pawns, 131. 
181Robinson, "Refugees in Thailand," 53. 
182Reynell, 57-8. 
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refugees had to be bought on the Thai economy at the insistence of the RTG. 183 Both 
provisions made sense from the Thai perspective. It is true that local villagers, like many 
indigenous populations at refugee camps all over the Third World, received less medical 
care and sometimes food than the refugees in the camps. Also, the food and supplies had 
to be purchased somewhere. If the camps were on Thai territory, one cannot really blame 
the RTG for insisting on benefiting from refugee aid money. 
Other ways in which the Thais benefited throughout the refugee crises was the 
strong military support from the United States, but more importantly, rapprochement with 
China. When Beijing had started supporting the Khmer Rouge, they withdrew military 
and fmancial support to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The CPT lead 
insurgency movements had been Thailand's greatest source of domestic instability. Also, 
its standing in the international community was much improved and brought in billions of 
tourist dollars. 
Developments on the international political scene paved the way for a fmal 
solution to the Cambodian refugee crisis. In December 1987, Prime Minister Hun Sen 
of the PRK met with Sihanouk for a series of bilateral negotiations to settle the fate of 
Cambodia. Sihanouk was not speaking on behalf of the CDGK. As a private person, he 
hoped to have more flexibility. He had taken a year long absence from his faction. 184 In 
July 1988 there was progress for a political negotiated settlement of Cambodia. The 
CDGK and PRK met with representatives from ASEAN and Vietnam. In November 1988 
Sihanouk, Son Sann (KPLNF), and Prime Minister Hun Sen (PRK) signed a joint 
communique agreeing to a series of negotiations. Despite China's insistence, the Khmer 
Rouge was not at the talks. 185 
183Reynell, Political Pawns, 58. 
184Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 141. 
185Reynell, 183. 
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By 1989 the Khmer Rouge was gaining an advantage over a weakened PRK. As 
Vietnam's economy could not continue supporting all their puppet regimes, some of the 
troops had been withdrawn from Cambodia. However, the Khmer Rouge was still a 
source of great embarrassment to the West, particularly the United States. As they started 
gaining more territory within Cambodia, their military tactics reminded the world that 
Cambodia might once again return to their control. 186 
When the Soviet Union signaled an unwillingness continue fmancing military and 
economic to Vietnam, the Vietnamese forces began a full withdrawal of its forces in 
Cambodia. The U.S. shifted policy and began bilateral talks with Vietnam. 187 These 
superpower shifts in long-standing policy lead the way to the 1989 Paris Peace 
Conference. Although it did not produce real peace in Cambodia, some tangible 
differences resulted. The four different factions of the civil war were able to reach a 
consensus on the principle of voluntary return, freedom of choice, and respect for 
fundamental human rights. 188 Although the latter two agreements are highly suspect, the 
refugees were allowed to be repatriated. 
With the end of the Cold War, the civil war in Cambodia heated up. Without 
Vietnamese backing, the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen government and the factions of the CDGK 
together with the UN Security Council agreed to a second peace conference in 1991 . This 
time, the UN Peace Plan was more than a piece of paper. It set the way for the UN 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNT AC) and nationwide elections that would let the 
186Josh Getlin, "Looking into Darkness," in Kari Rene Hall, Beyond the Killing Fields 
(Hong Kong: Asia 2000, 1992), 19. 
187Ibid. 
188USCR, "Something I ike Home Again", 10. The full text can be found in Annex IV 
of the Peace Accords. 
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people of Cambodia decide who they wanted to lead their government. 189 But more 
importantly, the fmal repatriation of 360,000 Cambodians was guaranteed. 
H. REPATRIATION AND CONCLUSION (1992-PRESENT) 
The 360,000 Cambodians on the Thai border are now officially repatriated. In 
realizing the enormity of the task accomplished by the UN and the Volags, the RTG, the 
many governments, and refugees it is any wonder that statement can be made. When 
UNTAC went into Cambodia, this peace-keeping mission was the most successful in the 
post-Cold War era190 in the context of the almost impossible mission that it faced. 
The first repatriation convoy left Cambodia on 30 March 1992. Exactly one year 
later, the last Cambodian refugee camp closed. UNTAC and the UNHCR were 
responsible for the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees. The UNHCR was given 
$600 US million dollars to aid the returning and internally displaced Cambodians. 191 Over 
540,000 Cambodians were given resettlement packages from six options: (a) Agricultural 
Land: included two hectares of agricultural land per family, a housing plot, wood for 
construction of a house frame, $25 US to buy thatch and bamboo, a household/agricultural 
kit (including water buckets, mosquito nets, various handtools, and a blue plastic sheet), 
and WFP food for 400 days; (b) House: a plot of land for a house, wood for construction 
of a house frame, $25 US to buy thatch and bamboo, a household/agricultural kit, and 
food for 400 days. (or 200 days if the returnee decided to settle in the Phnom Penh area); 
(c) Cash: included reintegration money of $50 US per adult and $25 US per child under 
12, a household/agricultural kit, and food for 400 days, or 200 days if settling near Phnom 
189USCR, "Something I ike Again", 11. 
19
°Cambodia Documentation Commission, "The UN in Cambodia: A Brief Evaluation 
of UNTAC in the Field of Human Rights," (New York, UN, 1994), 15. 
191Francis Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1993), 104. 
83 
Penh; (d) Income Generating Tools was too complicated and scrapped; (e) Employment: 
retumees who were offered jobs with UNTAC or other organization sin Cambodia while 
they were in the Thai camps would receive reintegration money (same as for Option C) 
and food for 400 days (200 in Phnom Penh) but no household/agricultural kit. Option E 
returnees generally, though not always were put on a fast-track to leave the camps; (f) 
Eamicy Reunion: this option was intended for families of soldiers or Option E returnees 
who had preceded them into Cambodia. It included reintegration money (same as amounts 
as for Option C) and food for 400 days (200 days in Phnom Penh). Option C- Cash was 
the most popular. The threat of civil war is still very much alive in Cambodia. 192 
From 23-28 May 1993, more than ninety percent of eligible Cambodians turned 
out to vote in the first fair and free UN-brokered elections. As a result, the Sihanouk 
faction (FUNCIPEC) gained a small majority of 45.5 percent over the Hun Sen 
(Cambodian People's Party) government. With 38.2 percent of the votes, Hun Sen was 
named to the number two post. They agreed to share power when members of the CPP 
threatened to secede with several of the eastern provinces. 193 The Khmer Rouge did not 
gain any political power and continues to be a source of friction for the State of Cambodia. 
The new government does not have a tradition of governing without corruption, 
coercion, and incompetence. While it lacks in cohesiveness and ability, they still hope to 
keep the powder keg from blowing. The Khmer Rouge is still a potent force to be 
reckoned with. Acts of sabotage, kidnapping, and subversive guerrilla activities have once 
again made them an outlaw organization in Cambodia. 
192USCR, "Something I ike Home Again", 23-4. 
193Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed, 101. 
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Financial support of the Khmer Rouge comes from the sale of gemstones and teak 
to Thai military officers. 194 Those activities are not officially sanctioned but condemned 
by the RTG. In the midst of this continued fighting, thousands of Cambodians have once 
again become internally displaced or had to flee across the border to Thailand. The RTG 
refuses to allow any refugees to seek permanent asylum in Thailand. 
Continued problems from the returnees are the lack of arable land, land-mines, and 
friction between returnees and the ones wo had stayed behind in Cambodia. Though 
UNT AC and the donor governments and agencies tried to address the disparities with a 
wide range of programs, it was difficult to reintegrate more than half a million people in 
one year. The disparities between the two groups include educational disparities and 
health (refugees in Thailand had received better care). (It is important to note that roughly 
half the population of the refugees had never seen Cambodia. Many were children who 
had been born in the camps.) The Khmer Rouge capitalized on the social unrest to 
promote themselves and stir rising nationalism against the coalition government, especially 
the Vietnamese-tainted Hun Sen faction. 195
 
Meanwhile, the RTG is courting Vietnam as the next member of ASEAN. It is in 
their best interests to see a stable and prosperous Cambodia on their border. There is no 
doubt that the end of the Cold War was the main impetus to resolving the Cambodian 
refugee problem. For over a decade, the refugee camps provided a base for Khmer 
Rouge/CDGK guerrilla activity. Although they were recognized by the international 
community as the legitimate government-in-exile, it is doubtful that sustained fighting 
from the border would have been tolerated for much longer. Eventually, the Vietnamese 
would have realized that developing their own economy was more important than 
194Nate Thayer, "Rubies are Rouge," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1991, 
p. 29. Although this particular article was written in 1991, the situation did not change much 
in 1994. 
195Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed, 105-6. 
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supporting the Cambodians. This would surely have made the Thais switch partiality to 
the Vietnamese. The attraction of a trading partner would have outweighed the political 
fight on their borders. The threat of a Vietnamese invasion had receded form the minds 
of the Thais before 1987. 
The Cambodian refugee crisis was far more complicated than the others. The huge 
numbers of people seeking asylum were a very real threat to their national security. 
In assessing the variables that make this situation unique, it is obvious that political 
problems exacerbated the refugee generation from Cambodia and kept them just within the 
borders of Thailand. Although economic and social factors were present, the 
overwhelming evidence shows that politics transcended all issues in the conflicts between 
the superpowers, the regional powers, and the coalition factions of the various Cambodian 
governments including the one in Phnom Penh. Ironically, a political solution rather than 
an economic boon was the solution to repatriating the refugees. 
In assessing the behavior of the Thais and the humanitarian agenices, especially that 
of the UNHCR, this situation caused more friction than cooperation. Unlike the Laotian 
case where both sides felt the refugees were driven by economic pull factors, the 
Cambodians were the victims of a Thai policy to use them as human buffers against the 
aggression of the Vietnamese. Although they showed some compassion by allowing so 
many refugees from Indochina to be afforded some measure of protection by the 
international community, let us not forget that only 9,000 refugees of Thai-descent were 
ever granted permanent asylum into Thailand. The amount of money skimmed from the 
humanitarian aid effort will never be known, but in exchange for money, the RTG 
"allowed" the refugees to be housed on Thai territory. The RTG was particularly adept 
at manipulating the international community into responding. As the next chapter will 
show, push backs and media worked more than once to shock the refugee-receiving 
governments into action. In the Cambodian situation, the incident at Preah Vihear was the 
most compelling for its shock value. 
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The humanitarian mission of the UN, Volags, and donor countries is 
commendable. However, would $36 US million dollars a year have been sustainable 
considering the many other refugees in the world that needed protection and assistance? 
Donor commitments were already flagging by 1989. Luckily for the UN, the 
Cambodians, and the RTG, the best thing that ever happened was the economic woes of 
the Soviet Union that lead to the end of the Cold War. 
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V. THAILAND AND VIETNAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the pro-American government in Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese 
Communists in Apri11975, it was the culmination of more than a century old struggle for 
Vietnamese ultra-nationalists seeking to drive out a dominant foreign power. It also 
signaled an end to the protracted "people's" revolutionary wars and the beginning of a 
Communist lead series of domination all over Indochina. Subsequently, pro-American 
sympathizers and people with ties to the ancien regime faced torture, execution, or re-
education camps. 
Although hundreds of thousands of refugees left for sanctuary in the United States 
and other Western nations, this chapter will focus primarily upon the Vietnamese refugees 
that sought asylum in nearby Thailand. Unlike the resettlement countries, Thailand's 
experience with Indochinese refugees was forced upon them by geography. Vietnam is 
bordered by the South China Seas on its east, the People's Republic of China to the north, 
and Laos and Cambodia on its west. The Mekong River which borders Thailand and 
Cambodia is less than a scant eighty or so miles away. This study is about the relationship 
between the Vietnamese refugees and their host government of Thailand and will include 
the international dimensions that integral to this crisis. Because of the superpower proxy 
wars of the Cold War, the United States was a key player in the RTG's handling of its 
Vietnamese refugee crisis. 
This chapter will examine the political, social, and economic events surrounding 
the push and pull factors of the Vietnamese exodus from 1975 to 1992. Although political 
considerations were the primary pull factor in drawing the refugees to the United States 
and other countries of resettlement, the root sources of push factors were social and 
economic. As this study will show, the three waves of Vietnamese refugees were 
motivated by different reasons. The first wave following the fall of Saigon were 
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comprised mainly of people with ties to the former South Vietnamese government and 
Catholics. This comparatively small group of politically persecuted refugees was 
expected. The second wave consisted mainly of ethnic Chinese, the Hoa, who were 
departing by the thousands with the tacit approval of the Hanoi government. As a wealthy 
minority group in Vietnam, they were socially branded for unpopular relocation plans. 
In the latter outflows, a broad spectrum of Vietnamese mainly from the middle and lowers 
classes left for primarily economic reasons. 
Thailand's reception of all the Indochinese refugees was not one of welcome. 
Relations were tense with all three refugee-generating governments. However, the attitude 
towards the Vietnamese refugees was particularly hostile. Unlike the Laotians that shared 
cultural and ethnic similarities with indigenous Thais and the Cambodians on the border 
that served a political purpose as a human "buffer" zone, the Vietnamese and Thais shared 
a legacy of centuries-old enmity. Of the three refugee groups, bilateral relations between 
the refugee-generating (SRV) and refugee-receiving (RTG) states in this case was the 
worst. Relative to the Cambodians, the numbers of Vietnamese in Thai detention centers 
and camps was low. However, more international media attention was given to the plight 
of the Vietnamese refugees than the other two groups, especially the "boat people" because 
of the inhumane push-off policies that lead to so many of their deaths. 
Despite the unpopular methods used by the RTG to deter Vietnamese refugee 
inflows, the result was satisfactory to the Thais. Arrivals decreased and the international 
community responded with two different measures to combat the refugee crisis. The first 
was a bilateral program in 1979 between the United States and the SRV called the Orderly 
Departure Program (ODP). The second was the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(CPA) which was signed and implemented by sixty-five countries. This chapter will 
examine how Thai tactics riveted the attention of the world and enacted an international 
solution to another component of the Indochinese refugee crises. 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Vietnamese people are descended from the fifteen or so tribal groups that 
comprised the Lac Viet. They were dominated for over one thousand years by the Chinese 
whose influence Sini:fied their culture. Vietnam was pejoratively called "Annam" or 
"protectorate of the pacified south. "196 In the tenth century, Vietnam broke away from 
their Chinese rulers and formed 900 years of self-rule all the while facing sporadic 
attempts by their northern Chinese neighbors to wield greater influence. Their empire was 
in a constant battle with the kingdom of Siam to gain suzerainty over vassal peoples in 
what is modern day Cambodia and Laos. However, unlike the Siamese who retained their 
independence from colonial empires, the Vietnamese did not. The emperor Tu Due signed 
the Treaty of Saigon in 1862 with France. It ceded territorial control over their empire 
to an imperial power and marked the second beginning of foreign domination. 197 
After the Second World War, the French made the same mistake in Vietnam as it 
had in its other protectorates. The colonial administrators favored an indigenous ruling 
elite and failed to recognize the pent -up nationalism of disenfranchised revolutionaries all 
over Indochina. The Battle of Diem Bien Phu in 1954 marked the end of French claims 
and the First Indochina War. Subsequently, the Geneva Agreement of 1954 partitioned 
the North and South along Communist and anti-Communist lines. Ho Chi Minh ruled in 
the North and Ngo Dinh Diem in the South. 198 A planned plebiscite deciding the 
reunification of Vietnam never materialized. Backing the South against Communism, the 
Americans followed in the footsteps of the French. And like the French, the Americans 
lost in what became known as the Second Indochina War. 
196Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 69. 
197Barbara Leitch Le Poer, "Historical Setting," in Ronald J. Cima, ed., Vietnam: a 
country study (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989), 30. 
198Steinberg, 360-1. 
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By backing one contender- by actually creating that contender-
the United States was not just fighting a border war or intervening ... 
in a power struggle between two similar contenders, two dynasties. 
It was entering into a moral and ideological struggle over the form 
of the state and the goals of the society. 199 
C. TIIE FIRST WAVE (1975-1978) 
1975 1976 1977 
Cambodian 17,038 6,428 7,045 
wwland Lao 10,195 19,499 18,070 
Highland Lao 44,659 7,266 3,873 
Vietnamese 4,446 5,213 5,328 
Total 76,338 38,406 34,316 
Source: UNHCR, Bangkok in Nakavachara and Rogge,"Thailand's Refugee Experience," 
p. 272. 
Table 7. Arrivals of Indochinese Refugees into Thailand, 1975-1978. 
The ani val of Vietnamese refugees into Thailand were not new. Thailand had been 
playing host to them for centuries. In the twentieth century, the Thais had allowed 
refugees from the First Indochina War to take refuge within their country. After the 
Second Indochina War which produced this first wave of refugees, the RTG had not yet 
identified them as a threat to national security. However, these policies changed in 
November 1977 with the installation of the Kriangsak government. Reasons cited for 
19
"Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New York: Random House, 1972), 7. 
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labeling the refugees as "illegals" were population pressures, land shortages, and potential 
economic friction between Thais and refugees. 200 
Of the 14,987 Vietnamese that arrived as part of the first wave of Indochinese 
refugees, only thirty-five percent came by boat. 201 The remainder came by land. The 
majority of refugees did not seek refuge in Thailand during this time. The United States 
was the intended destination of this group. Approximately 125,000 former South 
Vietnamese with ties to the American government or family relations were evacuated to 
the United States by American forces. 202 
D. TilE SECOND WAVE (1978-1982) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Cambodian 3,528 137,894 43,608 16 14 
Lowland Lao 48,781 22,045 28,967 16,377 3,203 
Highland Lao 8,013 23,943 14,801 4,356 1,816 
Vietnamese 8,818 16,119 26,491 22,511 6,228 
Total 69,140 200,001 113,867 43,260 11,261 
Source: UNHCR, Bangkok (from Nakavachara and Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," p. 
272. 
Table 8. Arrivals of Indochinese Refugees into Thailand, 1979-1982. Figures do not 
reflect the Cambodians in the border refugee camps. 
200William P. Tuchrello, "The Society and its Environment," in Thailand: a country study, 
116. 
201Nakavachara and Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Experience," 272. Compiled from 
UNHCR, Bangkok. 
202Zolberg et al., 164. 
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In late 1978 the Hanoi government and a splinter faction of the Khmer Rouge 
invaded Cambodia. The international ramifications of this action affected not only 
Cambodia, but foreign relations with Thailand, China, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and ASEAN. Relations between the Thais and Vietnamese had been historically strained. 
As a result, " ... Thai policies towards refugees from Vietnam have tended to be harsher 
than those directed towards an other group of Indochinese refugees. "203 Although both 
countries had been moving towards normalization, the Cambodian invasion reversed any 
progress. With the arrival of the boat people, enmity between the two states increased. 
The invasion also prompted negative reaction from the Chinese. They viewed encroaching 
Vietnamese as upstarts and wanted to curb further moves towards regional hegemony. 
Hanoi already controlled parts of Laos and now Cambodia. The ensuing border war 
between the PRC and SRV became the second clash between two Communists countries 
in the region. The United States condemned the Vietnamese presence and further pushed 
Vietnam into the Soviet's orbit. As for ASEAN, they put forth a united front against the 
invasion although individual members had varying degrees of disapproval. 204 
The border war with China and second outflow of Vietnamese refugees was in part 
prompted by Vietnamese policies towards their ethnic Han Chinese minority population, 
the Hoa. In 1978 as part of the new regime's continuing crackdown against former South 
Vietnamese elements, the Hoa were targeted for relocation to the New Economic Zones 
(NEZ). The NEZs were part of the new social and economic plans that abolished private 
enterprise and shifted populations from overcrowded urban areas to the sparsely populated 
rural zones. Prior to the 1975 takeover, the ethnic Chinese minority controlled "80 
percent of the food, textile, chemical, metallurgy, engineering, and electrical industries, 
203Robert P. De Vecchi, "Politics and Policies of 'First Asylum' in Thailand," in USCR, 
World Refugee Survey--1982 (Washington, D.C.: USCRJANCS, 1982), 20. 
204Ronald J. Cima, "The Society and its Environment," in Vietnam: a country study, 214-
220. 
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I 00 percent of wholesale trade, more than 50 percent of retail trade, and 90 percent of 
export-import trade. "205 After 1975 the Hoa were stripped of their property and made to 
relocate as peasants in the inhospitable and unarable rural areas of the NEZs. By diffusing 
the economic power of this traditional merchant class, the new government decreased 
subversive elements and likely sources of dissent, distributed its population more evenly, 
and encouraged minorities to leave for China and other countries of resettlement. 
Other push and pull factors maintained outflow of Vietnamese refugees. First, the 
United States continued to feel a moral obligation to offer resettlement for their former 
South Vietnamese supporters. This was a major pull factor that encouraged outflows of 
dissatisfied Vietnamese. The exoduses were viewed as a vindication of U.S. policy. A 
regime whose population chose "exit" because they could not utilize "voice" was negative 
propaganda for the West. Second, the Vietnamese government continued to overhaul 
social and economic policies. These push factors created the refugees known as the "boat 
people." They were the ethnic Chinese minority and former American supporters who 
continued to be a target for re-education, relocation, and detention. "The majority were 
under thirty-five years of age and included many young men, who left to avoid 
conscription. "206 
At first, the Vietnamese government made illegal departures very difficult. 
However, they quickly realized the societal benefits of decreasing ethnic tensions and 
political dissent by ridding themselves of their politically undesirable citizens. The illegal 
departures were in reality facilitated by the government. Publicly, however, the official 
position remained adamantly opposed to the departures. One cited reason was the negative 
impacts of refugees on their Southeast Asian neighbors. Of the 86,373 boat people that 
fled Vietnam in 1978, only 6,301 or 7.3 percent arrived in Thailand; of the 202,158 
205Cima, "The Society and its Environment," Thailand, 1 01. 
206Long, Ban Vinai, 40. 
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refugees in 1979, 11,887 or 5.8 percent; of the 71,451 in 1980, 21,549 or 30.2 percent; 
of the 74,749 in 1981, 18,378 or 24.6 percent; and of the 43,807 in 1982, 6,076 or 13.8 
percent Thailand was the fourth most important destination for the "boat people" behind 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia. 207 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
(Boat A rrivals in (202,158) (11,887) (21,549) (18,378) (6,076) 
Thailan d) 
(Perce ntage of total 7.3% 5.8% 30.2% 24.6% 13.8% 
Vietnam ese outflow) 
Compiled from UNHCR, Bangkok in Nakavachara and Rogge's "Thailand's Refugee Experience" 
and UNHCR The State of the World's Refugees 
Table 9. Percentage of Total Vietnamese Boat Refugees as Arrivals in Thailand 
Although the numbers of Vietnamese refugees in comparison to the Laotian and 
Cambodians was small, the prospect of granting asylum for them was not any more 
palatable than for the other groups. The Royal Thai Government looked towards the 
United States and other Western nations to absorb the influxes. The RTG policy reflected 
their attitude towards the United States as being the responsible party to the fall of the 
South Vietnamese government and subsequent refugee crisis. As the second crisis started, 
the recommendation at the U.S. Congressional hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian 
207UNHCR, The State ofthe World's Refugees, 26-7. Figures were tabulated with 
numbers of Vietnamese Land and Boat arrivals from UNHCR, Bangkok in Nakavachara and 
Rogge's "Thailand's Refugee Experience." 
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and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations was to favor increased 
refugee admissions. 208 
Sixty-five countries met at the First Convention on Indochinese Refugees in 1979 
to determine the fate of the waiting refugees. The media blitz that depicted the plight of 
the "boat people" captured the attention of the international community and effected a 
positive response. As a result, almost 700,000 Indochinese refugees were resettled to 
fifteen countries of permanent resettlement. 209 
Another means to prevent the dangerous illegal departures of the Vietnamese Boat 
People was the Orderly Departure Program. This was a bilateral arrangement between the 
United States and the Vietnamese government to facilitate legal migration brokered by the 
UNHCR. Applicants were to be screened approved by both governments before being 
resettlement could take place. In the early stages of the program, many of the former 
American supporters in re-education centers were not included in the list. Begun in 1979, 
the ODP did not make much of an impact until 1981 when 9,815 names matched. 
210 
The boat arrivals to Thailand arrived around the tip of Cambodia and into the 
coastal waters of the Gulf of Thailand. These arrivals were housed at the Songkhla camp 
on the Kra peninsula and at I..a.em Sing in the Chanthaburi province on the easten coast of 
the Gulf. In 1981, as part of the "humane deterrence" policy for all refugees, the camps 
208House Committee on International Affairs, Refugee crisis in Indochina 1978, 95th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 17 May, 8 
June, and 15 August 1978. Statements made before the committee invoked the Nazi atrocities 
and likened them to those committed by Pol Pot. Mr. Cherne of the Citizens' Commission on 
Indochinese Refugees made references to the American reaction to what was occurring in Nazi 
Germany and President Roosevelt's decision to refuse the docking of the St. Louis to an American 
port. The hearings stated that the United States had a responsibility to assist the refugees in 
Indochina and made recommendations for American refugee policy. 
20
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were closed to new anivals. New anivals were taken to inland camps where resettlement 
processing was not an option. They were put into camps with the overland Vietnamese 
and/ or mixed with the Cambodian refugees in the border camps. 211 
Land refugees anived in Thailand by way of Cambodia and Laos. These refugees 
faced land mines, fighting between the Khmer Rouge guerrillas and the Heng Samrin 
forces, starvation, and many other dangers to seek refuge in Thailand. The RTG found 
they were not settled as quickly as the Boat People. Generally, these refugees did not 
prefer overseas resettlement. " ... they remain in camp awaiting hoped-for reunion with 
other family members or return to their homelands. "212 Qualities that made them less 
desirable for resettlement were their lower levels of education and lack of transferable 
vocational skills. Many did not already have family members already residing in the 
United States nor did they have former ties to the American government in South Vietnam. 
These were the primary criteria for overseas resettlement to the United States. 213 In the 
end, the United States agreed to resettle approximately fifty percent of the land Vietnamese 
refugees. 
Throughout this peak period of Indochinese refugee exoduses, the RTG's primary 
method for resolving the crisis was third country resettlement. Although the United States 
and fourteen other nations were accepting the refugees by the hundreds of thousands, the 
Thais knew this would not continue indefinitely. This pressure combined with the ancient 
enmity for the Vietnamese resulted in a controversial and ugly series of incidents 
involving Thai fisherman. Disguised as "pirates", the fishermen found looting Vietnamese 
Boat People to be far more lucrative work than fishing. The boat people often fled from 
211 De Vecchi, "Politics and Policies of 'First Asylum' in Thailand," 20-1. 
212USCR, "Indochinese Refugees: No End in Sight," in World Refugee Survey--1981 (Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1981/ANCS), 18. 
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Vietnam with gold and other currency. "In 1981, 77 percent of the boats which left 
Vietnam and eventually landed in Thailand were attacked; in 1982, 65 percent; and in 
1983' 56 percent. "214 
The Gulf of Thailand piracy attacks have garnered much international criticism. 
Not only were they attacked for their gold, but women, children, and even men were 
viciously raped; they were drowned; or sold as prostitutes. Although the RTG did not 
endorse the attacks, little was done to prevent them. Few arrests of the pirates were made. 
If they were, the witnesses were often coerced not to testify. Witnesses have corroborated 
the unbelievable tales and even implicated Thai naval and marine patrols in the crimes. 
Yet, they continued while the RTG turned a blind eye to the attacks. 215 The media 
attention of the boat people and the piracy attacks resulted in programs like the ODP and 
the opening of quotas for refugees, their families, and immigrants. 
In 1981 the United States and the RTG agreed on a joint anti-piracy program 
funded with $2 US million dollars. The UNHCR coordinated a UN-sponsored program. 
The money was given to the RTG. The Thai National Security Council was the overall 
administrator and formed the Royal Thai Government Committee on the Suppression of 
Piracy, but generally, the programs proved ineffective. The committee's intentions were 
clearly reflected in the number of times it met during the first ten months since inception. 
They met only once. During this time, Prime Minister Kriangsak' s power was tenuous, 
the Communist Party of Thailand was still carrying on insurgency movements, the clashes 
on the Cambodian border, and other national security concerns stretched their available 
resources. 216 
214Roger Winter and Joseph Cerquone, "Pirate Attacks Against Vietnamese Boat People 
Continue," in World Refugee Survey--1984, 9. 
215lbid. 
216Winter and Cerquone, 9. 
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Whatever the true reasons for the Thai's lack of interest in combating this 
humanitarian crisis, the word did get back to the would-be boat people in Vietnam. The 
number of refugees decreased. Part of the credit must go to the ODP which opened the 
doors for legal immigration. From 1983 to 1986, there was a steady outflow of both 
refugees and migrants, but the numbers were manageable. 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
Boat Departures 28,055 24,865 22,214 19,538 
Orderly Departure Program 18,978 29,154 24,940 18,418 
Source: UNHCR, Ihe State of the World's Refugees, 26. 
Table 9. Comparison of Boat and ODP Departures from Vietnam. Figures are as of 
January of the calendar year. 
Overall, the Thais were very successful in minimizing the impact of the Vietnamese 
refugees. The burden of maintaining the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand was the smallest 
of the three Indochinese refugee groups. A combination of strong deterrent measures such 
as the "humane deterrence" policy of 1981, the "blind eye" approach to the piracy attacks, 
and refusing to grant the "illegals" permanent asylum kept the number of Vietnamese 
refugees low. Most importantly, however, the RTG was adept at garnering support from 
the international community. The heavy pressure on the United States and other 
resettlement countries was maintained and even fueled during this second wave. It enabled 
the RTG to put on the facade of being a compassionate and humanitarian country while 
funneling a great deal of the responsibility to the international community. 
E. THE THIRD WAVE (1986-1992) 
The third wave of Vietnamese refugees was a sutprise to the international 
community. The steady outflow of refugees and immigrants of the early and mid 1980s 
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averaged around 42,00. Yet at the beginning of 1986 the numbers of boat departures 
alone rose to 31,694. By 1989 the numbers had risen to 65,349. 217 
Thailand was alarmed by the new influx. In 1986 the number of boat arrivals was 
4,392. In 1987 the numbers had risen to 12,820. The dramatic increases were felt all 
over Southeast Asia. 218 In 1988 the RTG declared an end to first asylum for Vietnamese 
refugees and instituted the push-off policies that redirected the boat people towards 
international waters. More than 1,000 boats were pushed back to sea in one month. There 
were reports of more than 100 known dead. 219 Malaysia, too, redirected the boats. 
This brought about another media furor and captured the attention of the 
international community. The RTG were very good at manipulating both. The United 
States Congress convened several hearings to decide what measures should be taken for 
this third wave of Vietnamese boat people. 
The Thai rationale for denying access to resettlement at least for the 
foreseeable future is Thailand's concern not to draw even more 
Vietnamese asylum-seekers ... We testified last year that "it will take 
the creative energy of policy-makers throughout the international 
community to explore alternatives which embody humanitarian 
principles on the treatment of refugees but also relieve the burden 
faced by first asylum to refugees." Today I am pleased to report that, 
with U.S. leadership, this is in large measure taking place. 220 
217UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 26. 
218Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnamese Refugees: Why the Outflow Continues, II in Amin 
Saikal, ed., Refugees in the Modem World. Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 25. 
(Canberra: Department oflntemational Relations, The Australian National University, 1989), 45. 
21 ~obinson, "Refugees in Thailand," 53. 
220Statement of Jonathan Moore, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs at the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Indochinese Refugees at Risk: the Boat People Cambodians under 
Khmer Rouge Control and Re-education-Camp Detainees, lOlst Cong., 1st sess., 1978, hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 8 February 1989, 89. 
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As a result, the United States and other concerned and effected nations met in June 
at Geneva to convene the Second Convention on Indochinese Refugees. What resulted was 
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). For reasons that will be stated later, the scope 
of this plan was very different in the treatment of the third wave of asylum-seekers. Some 
of the elements of the CPA were: 
- All Vietnamese boat people would be permitted to land in first 
asylum countries and would be screened for refugee status. 
- All boat people who qualified as refugees would be resettled in 
a third country. Those who did not qualify would have to return 
Vietnam under a guarantee, monitored by UNHCR, that they 
would not be prosecuted for illegal departure. 
- A program would be set up by UNHCR to provide reintegration 
assistance to the returnees. 
- The ODP program would be expanded, its criteria liberalized and 
its procedures simplified to allow easier legal emigration for eligible 
groups such as family reunification cases and former re-education 
camp internees. 
-A "mass information campaign" would be launched in Vietnam to 
inform the population of the provisions of the CPA, in order to 
discourage those who would not qualify as refugees from embarking 
on a life-threatening journey in the mistaken belief that they would 
automatically be resettled in the West. 221 
This approach to the problem did not automatically assume the asylum-seekers were 
true refugees. In this case, the signatories of the second international conference were 
correct in their assumption. This third wave contained many economic migrants that were 
"supposed to be the beneficiaries of the revolution. "222 Instead, the devastated economy, 
221 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 27. 
222Zolberg et al., 165. 
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natural disasters, and Vietnam's monetary ostracization from the West and the UN made 
living conditions within the country difficult and were major push factors. Many knew 
of the better economic opportunities and material benefits available to them in the West. 
But only on the condition that they could get there. 
The United States and other resettlement countries offered the biggest pull factor: 
pennanent asylum in a Western country. As a result of the liberal policies, the Vietnamese 
who had relatives in the United States were eligible for asylum. The network of overseas 
Vietnamese had a system whereby a family member, usually male, would make the 
journey to a first asylum country. By far, the offer of resettlement was the main pull 
factor. As William Shawcross wrote: 
Another theory, which has been held by some refugee officials from the 
start, is that the very existence of the resettlement programs created a 
'pull factor' drawing Indochinese away from home. After all, half the 
world would like to live in Orange County - but only the Vietnamese 
and, to a lesser extent, the Cambodian and the Lao. were being offered 
any such opportunity. So of course thousands jumped and, despite 
the dangers, still jump at it. 223 
Once accepted for asylum in the West, immigration was possible under family 
reunification rules. The network was very effective in providing a place for emigration 
for the asylum-seeker. 224 In a sense, the economic migrants of this third wave exploited 
the refugee admissions quotas by jumping the system by claiming asylum. 
These asylum-seekers for the most part were not being persecuted for their race, 
religion, or political affiliation. They wanted better economic opportunities. 
Most are farmers and labourers who think they will fmd a 
better life elsewhere. The Vietnamese appear well organised, 
223Thayer, "The Refugee Exodus from Vietnam: Why the Outflow Continues," Pt. 2, 
Quoted from William Shawcross, Canberra Times, 10 June 1989. 
224Zolberg et al., 165. 
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and officials in Thailand say many often know the names of 
the W estem refugee officials operating at Phanat Nikhom, the 
main holding camp for Vietnamese refugees in Thailand. They 
leave Phanat Nikhom when they have a visa to settle in the West. 225 
The dangers were definitely still present. Although the anti-piracy programs had 
started to decrease the number of attacks, there was evidence pointing to a darker effect 
of the program. Because of the program's efficacy in punishing the perpetrators, the 
pirates were more inclined to dispose of the evidence, that is, kill any survivors that cold 
live to tell a story. Even a United States naval warship, the U.S.S. Dubuque was guilty 
of not assisting a drifting Vietnamese boatload of refugees. 226 
As a result of the intemational attention and the CPA, more Vietnamese refugees 
were repatriated to a Vietnam with a sagging economy. In 1990 the Vietnamese economy 
suffered a series of unemployment shocks. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf 
War, and a recession in Europe forced thousands of overseas Vietnamese workers to retum 
home. The Vietnamese anny, once with 1.3 million troops was cut in half. The resulting 
unemployment rate was more than twenty percent. Dissent was intemalized by massive 
human rights abuses as reported by Amnesty Intemational and the Intemational League 
for Human Rights. 227 
By 1991 the number of piracy attacks was zero. The numbers of Vietnamese 
refugees was declining. Relations between Vietnam and Thailand improved. By the end 
of 1993 only 9,800 Vietnamese refugees remained in Thailand. These are the die-hards 
225Thayer, "The Refugee Exodus from Vietnam: Why the Outflow Continues," Part 2. 
226Court Robinson, "Sins of Omission: The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisis," in World 
Refugee Survey--1988, 5. By not rescuing the boatload of 110 passengers, the commanding 
officer condemned them to drifting for days. The survivors ran out of supplies and were forced to 
become cannibals to survive. They were rescued a month later. 52 survived. The commanding 
officer ofthe U.S.S. Dubuque was court martialed. 
227USCR, World Refugee Survey--1991 (Washington, D.C.: USCR/ANCS, 1991), 67. 
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who do not want to give up their hopes for resettlement to the West. The Vietnamese 
government has allowed the UNHCR to monitor repatriated refugees. For Thailand, the 
refugee crisis is nearly over. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the numbers of Vietnamese refugees relative to the Laotian or Cambodian 
refugees were low, there were several variables that created bigger problems for the Royal 
Thai Government. One, the ancient rivalry between the two countries repeated itself in 
the invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Mistrust and ethnic tensions between the Thais and 
Vietnamese manifested in a harsher treatment of the Vietnamese refugees although the 
second wave were mostly ethnic Chinese Hoa. Two, the unfortunate deterrent policies 
practiced by the Thai government in the form of push-backs and late prosecution of pirates 
gained them nothing but international critici~;m. Sutprisingly, the Thais did not feel their 
actions warranted such condemnation. Three, the lure of resettlement became a pull 
factor. The policy of getting rid of the refugees was merely creating more refugees. This 
Catch-22 situation proved to be extremely frustrating to both the RTG and the international 
community. For the majority of the Vietnamese refugees, Thailand was never the intended 
country of pennanent asylum. 
The first wave of refugees were fleeing political persecution was expected in all 
three Indochinese cases. In the Vietnamese case, the major push and pull factors were 
social and economic. The mild "ethnic cleansing" of the ethnic Chinese population 
released societal pressures. The latter wave of asylum-seekers was driven by decreased 
economic opportunities in Vietnam. 
In resolving this crisis, it is obvious the role of the UNHCR and the international 
community was the key. Not only were the resettlement countries accepting refugees, but 
addressing the root causes of refugee generation. As economic development occurs in 
Vietnam, the likelihood of a fourth wave of refugees is low. In 1994 the United States 
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lifted the trade embargo against Vietnam. After twenty years, normalized relations seem 
to be in the future. For Thailand, who is Vietnam's primary champion for ASEAN 
membership, the renewed economic vigor of Vietnam means an expanding source of raw 
materials, an ever increasing market, and hopefully, no more refugees. Being eminently 
practical, the Thais have once again subordinated past political feuds to seek the higher 
road to wealth and prosperity in a new economic trading partner. 
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VI. LESSONS FOR TIIE UNITED STATES 
A. CONCLUSIONS FROM TIIE TIIAI EXPERIENCE 
1. PUSH FACTORS 
Thailand's experience with Indochinese refugees from 1975-1992 chronicled a 
myriad of push factors present in refugee crises. There are several general assumptions 
that can be inferred for most refugee movements. The following fmdings are from the 
case studies of Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese refugee movements into Thailand. 
a. The basic mot of all refugee generation lies in political change. This 
is the inherent cause of persecution. Political upheaval can and in most cases exacerbate 
pre-existing economic and social conditions. Fragile economies can deteriorate rapidly 
from a disruption in crop plantations, international embargoes and sanctions against an 
unfriendly regime, and misguided fiscal and monetary policies that discourage private 
enterprise and a free market system. Ethnic tensions will increase persecution of a 
minority, especially if that group formerly held power or controlled the economy. In each 
of the three refugee flows into Thailand, the fall of a particular regime and subsequent 
change of guard created an exodus of refugees. 
b. The occurrence of an initial outflow of refugees supportive or 
sympathetic to the onsted government can he assumed. In Laos, the Hmong hilltribe 
people were persecuted for fighting in the resistance against the Pathet Lao. The Hmong 
and other resistance groups continued insurgency movements after the installation of the 
new government. In Cambodia, the rise of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge created an 
outflow of Lon Nol and Sihanouk supporters. The fall of Saigon triggered a mass exodus 
of pro-American South Vietnamese. 
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c. The second flow of refugees have characteristiCJllly been the 
migration of people (a) who were not able to leave with the initial mJtflow and (b) 
those_who_hecame the victims or targets of the new regime for real and perceived 
opposition. The second wave of Laotians were comprised of both Hilltribe and Lowland 
people. Stark political and economic conditions prompted both groups of Laotians to seek 
protection in Thailand. The Hilltribes were waging insurgency movements against the 
Pathet Lao to return to a pre-1975 Laos. Ill-suited adaptations to Western cultures 
influenced many to forgo third-country resettlement. The Lowland Lao sought 
resettlement in the West. Their motives for seeking refuge in Thailand were motivated by 
poor economic conditions in Laos. 
The second wave of Cambodians were fleeing political persecution from the Khmer 
Rouge and/or the new Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh. Parts of the 
Khmer Rouge refugee population were moved against their will and at gunpoint by their 
captor-leaders. They were perceived to be sympathetic to the rebel insurgency movement. 
Anyone from a Khmer Rouge-controlled refugee camp was automatically labeled as a 
guerrilla or sympathizer. The Cambodians that were not affiliated with the Khmer Rouge 
supported either the Son Sann forces or the Sihanouk-lead FUNCINPEC. 
The Vietnamese refugees comprising the second wave were mainly the targets of 
ethnic discrimination. The ethnic Hoa lost both their property and human rights under the 
new regime. These push factors prompted a willingness to risk death on the high seas to 
seek better conditions outside of Vietnam. 
d. In latter waves, fQ)nomic push factors generate refugee movements 
more aptly described as economic migrants. Pull factors such as resettlement 
opportunities and better living conditions in the camps generated these latter outflows. The 
demographic makeup of these refugees differed significantly from the former two. This 
group was less educated and lacked former ties to the ousted government. Questions arose 
from receiving government surrounding their status as bona fide refugees. 
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Refugees from ... 1st Wave 2nd Wave 3rd Wave 
Laos political political/ economic economic 
Cambodia political political political 
Vietnam political social/ economic economic 
Table 10. Primary independent variables that were the push factors for refugee generation 
2. PULL FACTORS 
When conditions in a state are so unbearable as to create mass migrations of 
people, even countries that do not offer pennanent asylum or guarantees of personal safety 
such as Thailand are preferable to remaining in the country of origin. By far, the two 
most important pull factors were pennanent resettlement to a third country, preferably 
Western and the use of camps as a base for insurgency movements. 
a. Permanent resettlement· The three groups that were most drawn to 
resettlement abroad were the Lowland Lao, the educated Cambodians that supported pre-
Khmer Rouge governments, and the Vietnamese. For many of the Laotians, living 
conditions in the refugee camps were better than back in Laos. Refugee camps provided 
food, shelter, education, vocational training, and opportunities to sell indigenous 
handicraft to the local marketplaces. Vietnamese responses given for reasons of flight 
were usually to seek better opportunities abroad and/or to escape political persecution. 
b. lise of camps for a guerrilla base· General trends among the Hmong, 
land Vietnamese, and Khmer Rouge factions showed a preference to wait until conditions 
allowed for repatriation. The Khmer Rouge were screened out for asylum abroad. 
Persons who commit atrocities are not eligible for resettlement. This was a problem for 
many of the people trapped within the Khmer Rouge camps that were guilty by 
association. The guerrilla resistance movements fought for a change in the government. 
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3. VARIABLES IN THAI REFUGEE RECEPTION POLICIES 
At the onset of the refugee crises, the Royal Thai government was beset with their 
own domestic problems. Because of internal politics, the treatment of the Indochinese 
refugees ranged from tolerance, hostility, to resignation throughout the crises. 
Initially, the RTG was somewhat sympathetic to the plight of the non-Communists 
that fled the Communist regimes in Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Saigon. Thailand was 
fighting its own Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgencies. The CPT was 
receiving ideological, military, and fmancial aid from China. When the second wave 
arrived, the Chinese agreed to stop aiding the CPT in return for Thai support of the Khmer 
Rouge. This quelled the CPT movements. By the time the third wave arrived, the Thai 
economy was developing rapidly and the resolution of the refugee crisis seemed 
improbable without a political solution. 
Much of how the refugees were received depended upon four variables I have 
identified: (a) ethnicity; (b) interstate relations; (c) international response; and (d) political 
utility. These variables determined how Thailand as the receiving state dealt with the three 
refugee groups. 
Vari abies in Laotians Cambodians Vietnamese 
refug ee reception 
Ethn icity Positive Neutral Negative 
state relations Inter Positive Neutral Negative 
Inter national response Positive Positive Positive 
Po lit ical utility Negative Positive Neutral 
Table 11 . Determinant variables in the treatment and reception of refugees 
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a. Ethnicity: In the Laotian case, shared ethnicity between Laos and Thais 
was a plus. They were received without the rancor directed at the Vietnamese arrivals. 
Theethnic Chinese Vietnamese were not treated any better. Vietnamese refugees of any 
ethnic background were disliked. Ethnicity was not a discemable variable in the reception 
of the Cambodians. 
b. Interstate relations· With the exception of a few skirmishes over 
border disputes, the RTG and Pathet Lao were the first to have normal relations. 
Although the RTG allowed the "warrior-refugee" Hmongs and other Hilltribes to take 
refuge in the camps, it did not officially endorse any insurgency movements to topple the 
government. 
The Cambodian government in Phnom Penh was not recognized by neither the 
Thais nor international community to the consternation of both Heng Samrin and Hanoi. 
It was not conducive for normal relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh. However, 
the Thais recognized the coalition government-in-exile which included the Khmer Rouge. 
Initially, the Khmer Rouge and the RTG were at odds because of Khmer Rouge attacks on 
Thai villagers. However, these issues became subordinated after the 1978 invasion by 
Vietnam. This made it difficult to fully endorse and accept the Cambodian refugees. The 
Thai military was suspicious of Cambodian refugee support. 
Centuries of past enmity between the two states for control over Laos and 
Cambodia incurred ethnic and political tensions present into the Cold War period. With 
Vietnamese aspirations to be the hegemon in the Southeast Asian subregion, the Thais 
were particularly indisposed towards SRV aggression. This reflected in the treatment of 
their refugees. 
c. International response: Without the presence of the UNHCR and the 
many other Volags as well as government agencies, the Thais would have treated the 
refugees with even less compassion. Their reluctance to house, feed, and care for over 
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one million refugees was not unreasonable. Although permanent asylum was but granted 
to a handful and only a modicum of sustenance was given to the refugees, the Thais must 
receive due credit. Because tbe international community responded with humanitarian 
assistance and resettlement plans, the Thais were not faced with a domestic crisis stemming 
from the refugee inflows. This was extremely important to the Western alliance. As a 
linchpin state in the region, the fall of Thailand to Communism would have been a blow 
for the West. By subsidizing tbe refugee camps and turning a blind eye to the graft and 
corruption demanded from members of the Thai military, the West was able to support an 
important ally while providing humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of genuine 
refugees. 
d. Political utility: The political utility of refugees was an important 
factor in sustaining the refugee camps. Lack of political resolution towards non-
Communist governments in refugee-generating states sustained refugee generation. The 
Laotians began to wear out their welcome. However, they were the first group to be part 
of a bilateral repatriation plan between Thailand and a refugee-generating state. 
The Cambodians on the border served as a buffer against further Vietnamese 
encroachment. As long as the Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh existed, the 
RTG National Security Council was not loathe to have the refugee camps on their border. 
The refugees were purposedly labeled "displaced persons" and ineligible for resettlement. 
Their positive utility made hostages of the camp inhabitants. 
The Vietnamese served little utility. Their existence and presence lead to push-
back and human deterrence policies to bring back the focus and attention of the 
international community on the refugee crisis. It resulted in two international Indochinese 
conferences and two plans for a durable solution. They were the ODP and the CPA. 
However, because of the incredible criticism and negative press of the Gulf of Thailand 
attacks and push-off policies received by the RTG, any political utility gained from 
resettlement offers was offset. 
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4. THAI POLICIES THAT AVERTED DOMESTIC UNREST 
How then did the Royal Thai Government avert domestic upheaval related to the 
major influxes of refugees? The RTG created unfavorable conditions to minimize the pull 
factors and maintained strict adherence to refusing permanent asylum to the refugees. 
First, the Thais are not a signatory to the UN Protocol. This absolves them of 
legal responsibility to provide asylum. However, for moral and ethical reasons, the Thais 
could not completely close their borders to arrivals. Physically, it would have been 
impossible to maintain control of their porous borders. They lacked the technology and 
resources. 
Second, by declaring the refugees as displaced persons and/or illegal immigrants 
the RTG had the flexibility to grant or deny refugee status throughout the crises. The 
plight refugees at the Khao I Dang detention center were no different than the ones at the 
border refugee camps. However, because the Thais chose to label the border inhabitants 
as "displaced persons" instead of as refugees, they denied them a chance to be screened 
for resettlement opportunities. 
Third, the use of "humane deterrence" and "push-off' policies were undeniably 
effective in controlling the rate of arrivals. Although projected arrival numbers cannot be 
measured in the absence of the policies, the numbers did level off after 1981 when 
"humane deterrence" was put in place. 
Fourth, the Thais manipulated the international community for humanitarian 
assistance. Despite the gloom and doom forecasts of the economic burdens posed by the 
refugees, the international community donated generously for their maintenance. Along 
the way, Thai military officials and Thai villagers benefited as well. Whenever interest 
in the refugees waned, the Thais were adept at creating a media event designed to bring 
attention to the plight of their unwanted guests. 
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B. SUMl\iARY OF RECENT U.S. REFUGEE POLICY 
At the end of fiscal year 1993 (FY93) 132,144 refugees applied and were granted 
political asylum in the United States. 228 (See Appendix C) By the year's end of 1993, 
more than 150,000 people were in need of protection or assistance. 229 Refugees can apply 
for asylum through two avenues, application at overseas Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) offices or at domestic INS offices. Approval rates for asylum are much 
higher for overseas refugee admissions applicants than for asylum-seekers within the 
United States by more than a three-to-one ratio. Paradoxically, the guidelines for refugees 
admission to the United States is stricter. In order for a refugee to be screened in for 
resettlement/asylum to the United States, they must fit into one of the six priority groups: 
Priority One: Compelling Concern or Interest 
Priority Two: Former U.S. Government Employees 
Priority Three: Family Reunification (spouses, unmarried 
children, or parents of persons in the United States) 
Priority Four: Other Ties to the United States 
Priority Five: Additional Family Reunification (married children, 
siblings, grandparents or grandchildren of persons 
in the United States) 
Priority Six: Otherwise of National Interest (in specified regional 
groups whose admission is in the national interest)230 
228U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, World Refugee Report 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1993), 263. The following comprise regional breakdowns: 
Africa 5,491 East Asia: 51,848 Private Sector Initiatives (Cubans): 853 
Eastern Europe: 64,184 Latin America: 2,924 Near East and South Asia: 6,844 
229USCR, World Refugee Survey--1994 (Washington, D.C.: USCR/ANCS, 1994), 40. 
Included in these figures are people from former Yugoslavia. 
230Court Robinson and Bill Frelick, "Lives in the Balance: The Political and 
Humanitarian Impulses in US Refugee Policy," International Journal of Refugee I ;~w Special 
Is.s.ue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 300. 
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The United States ranked number one in refugee admissions from 1975-1992. 
During this period, more than 1. 7 million refugees were given resettlement and permanent 
asylum. The top ten groups granted asylum were Former Soviet Union (61 ,298); 
Vietnamese (ODP) (40,826); Laos (7,315); Vietnam (self-departure) (3,510); Ethiopia 
(2,972); Cuba (2,867) plus 853; Iran (2,692); Somalia (1 ,570); Romania (1 ,499); 
Afghanistan (1 ,480). The bulk of refugees from Eastern Europe, were primarily from the 
Former Soviet Union; and East Asia were primarily from Vietnam. 
Resettlement 1975-1992 1992 Only Total Population Ratio of Resettled 
Country Cumulative (in Millions Refugees/ Asylees 
to Total Pop. 
Sweden 152,608 12,791 8.7 1:57 
Canada 407,379 36,409 28.1 1:69 
Australia 205,862 9,758 17.8 1:86 
United States 1,731,090 137,395 258.3 1:149 
Denmark 34,089 4,100 5.2 1:153 
Norway 27,410* 2,830 4.3 1:157 
Switzerland 32,297 8,839 7.0 1:217 
France 227,085 10,943 57.7 1:254 
New Zealand 13,028 800 3.4 1:261 
Austria 29,007 2,289 7.9 1:272 
Netherlands 30,300 4,553 15.2 1:502 
Germany 112,262 # 9,189 81.1 1:722 
Spain 39,166 296 39.1 1:998 
United Kingdom 35,032 16,435 58.0 1:1,656 
Source: USCR, :World Refugee Sun:ey 1994 
Table 12. Refugees Resettled in Relation to Total Population *Inaccurate, statistics 
unavailable for 1975-1981. #Does not include ethnic Gennans from the 
fonner Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania 
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In FY93, asylum approval rates (people who apply after arriving in the United 
States) were highest among the Syrians, Sudanese, and Somalis. The largest number of 
asylum-seekers seem to be from Third World countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, PRC, 
and Haiti. (See Appendix D) The nationalities of the asylum-seekers would lead one to 
believe they are more likely to be economic migrants. Approval rates are as follows: 
Guatemalans (6.5 percent of 34,681); Salvadorans ( 4.6 percent of 15,362); Chinese (49.4 
percent of 14,354); Haitians (22.8 percent of 11 ,377). 231 
The United States Refugee Act of 1980 provided an avenue for refugees and their 
families to enter the United States, which was supposed to establish uniform and non-
ideological statndards for determining refugee eligibility. 232 However, this belies actual 
implementation. Southeast Asian and Former Soviet Union refugees continues to be high. 
In fiscal year 1993, they were the largest number to be admitted at 48,627. 233 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. REFUGEE POLICY 
The following conclusions are provided as suggestions for broad U.S. refugee issue 
applications. 
1. The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in refugee generation and our 
relationship with those regimes that tended to create them. (See Appendix E) If there is 
one lesson to be learned from this study, it is this: THE COLD WAR IS OVER. Yet, our 
refugee admission reflect the attitude of stalwart Cold Warriors. During the Cold War, 
refugees from Communist countries were granted de facto asylum. This is reflected in the 
231 USCR, World Refugee Survey--1994, 169. 
232Arthur C. Helton, "The Refugee Act's Unfulfilled Asylum Promise, "in USCR, 
World Refugee Survey--1985, 5. 
233Ibid., 170. 
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reception of Cuban versus Haitian refugees. Cubans were granted automatic asylum while 
the Haitians were often interdicted in international waters and returned to Haiti. 
It is 1994 and yet our refugee admissions numbers are highest from the former 
Soviet Union and Vietnam. The State Department move towards decreasing Vietnamese 
refugee admissions is a logical policy. 234 The latest waves of refugees to leave Vietnam 
are most likely to be economic migrants, not refugees. 
2. As the Indochinese refugee crisis showed, there are at least two waves of 
refugees that exit a country after the fall of a government. The first is usually expected. 
The second has distinct elements of economic factors driving the exodus. If the United 
States pursues foreign policy objectives by supporting a particular regime, we must be 
willing to accept the consequences of failure. Because of our major role in reinstating and 
supporting Aristide, we are ethically and morally bound to accept any future refugees that 
may be created from a toppled Aristide government. 
This follows the patter of Vietnamese from Indochina. Although we accepted 
refugees from all three countries, we have accepted many Southeast Asians. This hearkens 
back to our moral obligations. With the last remaining Vietnamese refugees coming in by 
the end of FY -96, we should deny admissions to those with frivolous claims, especially 
the economic migrants that depart on their own. 
3. As shown in Thailand's long crisis with its refugees, there were four variables 
that determined how refugees were accepted and/or treated. They were ethnicity, 
interstate relations, international response, and political utility. We must be vigilant in 
disregarding these variables when determining our own refugee admission and asylum 
policies. 
Our neighbor to the south is Mexico. We share common histories and to some 
degree, ethnicity. The presence of illegal immigrants was largely ignored in the 1980s 
234Seth Mydans, "Exodus of Vietnamese Refugees Reaches Last Phase," New York 
Times 5 December 1994, Southeast Asia Discussion List, SEA-L@msu.edu. 
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when the economy was growing. In the recession years, Mexican "illegals" have become 
the target of xenophobic and racist policies that target them as scapegoats. For the RTG, 
the Laotians became a nuisance during the latter years of the refugee crisis. Many were 
drawn to better economic opportunities across the Mekong River. We must get better at 
enforcing border control. 
The correlation between Cuba and Cambodia is thus. The United States once 
viewed Castro as a threat, especially during the Cold War. This fear was abated long ago. 
The Thais also viewed the Hanoi government warily, but came to realize an invasion was 
unlikely. The Cuban refugees that came during the 1980 Marie! Boatlift overwhelmed 
U.S. policy-makers as did the large numbers of Cambodians on Thailand's border. Unlike 
the Thais that bowed to international pressures of humanitarian aid, U.S. policy-makers 
are bowing to the political pressures of a very strong lobby group, the Cuban-Americans. 
We should lift the economic sanctions and embargoes against one of the poorest countries 
in our own hemisphere. The revolution is over. The opportunities for an expanded 
market for American goods is enormous. 
The perception that racism blocks the black Haitians from receiving the same 
treatment as the Cuban refugees is valid. Repression and human rights abuses in Haiti are 
assuredly worse than the socialist state of Cuba. Thailand sought to minimize Vietnamese 
refugee flows by pushing them back to sea. Is interdiction at sea followed by a one-way 
trip to Port-au-Prince more humane? 
The U.S. government should allow for a more important variable to dominate the 
criteria for asylum conditions. NEED. The first High Commissioner, Nansen helped 
those that were stateless. He turned a blind eye to the domestic politics of strong lobby 
groups and ethnicity by reaching out to people regardless of their situation. 
Although the U.S. State Department considers "national interest" in formulating 
refugee admission policies, we must not allow domestic politics to drive refugee 
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admissions. 235 Even if the most vocal special interest groups favor admissions of certain 
groups over others, refugees should be admitted based on their humanitarian needs. This 
does not have to be true for immigration quotas and admissions. These numbers should 
be driven by domestic politics. 
4. Among the most effective of the Thai policies was "humane deterrence." 
Although pushing people over land mines, drowning or pushing them off to sea, or 
involuntary repatriation is not advocated, there is something to be said for decreasing pull 
factors. This is tied into our immigration and public assistance policies. Our deportation 
policies for bogus claimants is too lax. Automatic admissions to mass inflows should 
continue to be checked with refugee camps. 
When the boat arrivals from Cuba and Haiti threatened to create a national crisis, 
they were housed in makeshift refugee camps at NAS Guantanomo Bay, Cuba. This was 
an effective deterrent. Although boat people continued to leave for the shores of Florida, 
the numbers would have been higher if all the refugees had been granted automatic asylum 
and entry onto American soil. When Castro decided to decrease tensions in 1980 through 
the Mariel Boatlift, the refugees were allowed to integrate into American communities. 
Ten percent of the Marilitos were criminals and the mentally ill, this proved to be a 
political human weapon against the United States by Cuba. To preclude another crisis, the 
response to the Summer of 1994's arrivals was a calculated risk that paid off. 
When the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians arrived in the United States, 
many were able to sponsor family members. Part of the package included social security, 
medical benefits, and welfare. Unlike the first wave of educated elite with ties to the 
American government, the latter waves did not have any translatable vocational skills or 
language proficiency. Many refugees arrived to the United States through family reunion. 
235Telephone interview with U.S. State Department official, Bureau for Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, 7 December 1994. 
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Usually, a son was chosen to make the journey to the refugee camps in hopes of third 
country resettlement. 
According to a State Department official, the interwoven complexities between 
immigration, illegal immigration, and public assistance policies give few alternatives to 
these refugees. Minimum wage jobs do not offer enough medical and other benefits to the 
unskilled workers. They believe it is better for the welfare of their children to be on the 
public dole. The overreaching public assistance policies should be reformed. People who 
have not paid taxes into the system receive benefits because they can. This is an error in 
our own policies. Reform should allow minimum wage workers some leeway for medical 
assistance and perhaps some subsidy, but not the "work" penalty that afflicts all Americans 
on public assistance. Part of the sponsorship program should be the ability of the 
sponsoree to take care of the family members with limited assistance from the government. 
5. Thailand's long history of Indochinese refugee crises did not end until political 
solutions were brought about. As part of the durable solutions enacted by the UNHCR, 
voluntary repatriation rather than resettlement is the best answer. It is a physical 
impossibility to relocate and resettle over 17 million refugees to receiving states. Effecting 
political change, promoting a stable government, and encouraging economic development 
should be the priority of the United States around the globe. By bringing peace and 
prosperity to a country, the tide of refugees is less likely to occur. 
Part of this process should be the continuation of generous fmancial aid to 
humanitarian organizations despite the inherent problems of waste and politicization. The 
United States was the lead country in the resolution of the Indochinese refugees. It is the 
best way to abate the refugee crises and bring about a more peaceful world order. 
By adapting and applying lessons learned from the Thai experience, U.S. policy-
makers could make American refugee and asylum policies more just. In this way, perhaps 
the generous spirit of Americans that was a legacy of our immigrant forefathers can 
reduce the tensions caused by policies gone awry. 
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In addition to first-hand assessments, information gathered from other on-the-ground sources, 
including local and international NGOs, and from responses to USCR inquiries by governments 
and intergovernmental organization, Survey statistics and country reports also draw from the 
following sources: 
Africa Cm?fidential. London. 
Africa Reports. African American Institute. N.Y. 
Amnesty International publications London. 
Breakdml'll in the Balknns. Central Endowment for 
lntemational Peace. Washington, D.C. 
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Central.-!.merica .\'ewspeak. Central America Resource 
Cenkr Austin. T exa~ 
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United Nations. N.Y. 
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APPENDIX B. WORLD REFUGEE STATISTICS 
Host countries, and the number of refugees received, are in bold type. 
AFRICA TOTAL 5,825,000 
Algeria *121.000 Egypt 11,000 Malawi 700,000 Tanzania 479,500 
W. Sahara *80.000 Somalia 6,000 Mozambique 700,000 Burundi 350.000 
\lali 35.000 Palestinians 4,300 Mali 13,000 Mozambique 60.000 
'\iger 6.000 Ethiopia 400 Mauritania 13.000 Rwanda 50.000 
Angola 11.000 Other 300 Mauritania 46,000 Zaire I 5.000 
Z;1ir~? I 1.000 Ethiopia *156,000 Mali 46.000 S. Africa 3.000 
Benin J20.0{1(J Somalia *I 00.000 Namibia 5,000 Somalia 1.200 
Togo 120.000 Sudan 43.000 Angola 5,000 Other 300 
Botswana 500 Djibouti 7.000 NigH 3,000 Uganda *257,000 
Burkina Faso 6,000 ~env:~ 6,(!()0 Chad 3.000 Sudan I 50.00fJ 
\!ali 6.000 Gabon 200 Nigeria 4,400 Rwanda *90.01JIJ 
Burundi *110.000 Gambia 2,000 Liberia 3.000 Zaire 15.000 
RHanda *85.000 Senegal 2.000 Chad 1,400 Other 2.00() 
Zaire 25.000 Ghana 133,000 Rwanda 370,000 Zaire 452.000 
Cameroon 2,500 Togo 120.000 Burundi 370.000 Angola 200.00(1 
Chad 2.000 Liberia 13.000 Senegal 66,000 Sudan 120.00() 
Other 500 Guinea *570,000 Mauritania 66.000 Burundi 60JJ(JI) 
Central African 41,000 Liberia *420.000 Sierra Leone 15,000 Rwanda 50.()()() 
Republic Sierra Leone *I 50.000 Liberia 15.000 Uganda 20.000 
Sudan 2HJOO Guinea-Bissau 16,000 South Africa *300,000 Other 2.00() 
Chad l \UJO(I Senegal 16.000 Mozambique *300.000 Zambia 158,500 
(."on~o 13.000 i.:Mna *332,000 Sud lUI *633.000 Angola 120.000 
.. \ngula 10.000 So~1alia *280.000 Eritrea *420.000 Mozan1bi4ue 22.UUO 
Chad 2.000 Sudan 37,000 Ethiopia *200.000 Zaire 13.0()() 
Other 1.000 Ethiopia 10,000 Chad *7.000 S Africa 500 
Cote d'IYoire 250,000 Other 5,000 Other 6.000 Other 3.00 
Liberia 250.000 Lesotho 100 ~'waziland 57.000 Zimbabwe 200,lHUI 
Djibouti 60,000 S. Africa 100 Mozambiqu~ 50,000 Mozambi4uc 20U.OUO 
Somalia 40.000 Liberia 110,000 S. Africa 7.00() 
Eth10pia 20.000 Sierra Leone I 10.000 
Source World Refugee Survey--1994, USCR *Indicates that sources vary significantly in the numher reported. 
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC TOTAL 468,000 
Australia 2,950 Indonesia 2,400 Malaysia 8,150 Thailand 108,300 
China *296,900 Vietnam 1,900 Burma 5,100 Burma 74.000 
Vietnam 285.500 Can1bodia 500 Indonesia 1,700 Laos 25.100 
Bum1a *10.000 Japan 950 Vietnam 1,150 Vietnam 8.800 
Laos 1.400 Vietnam 900 Former Yugoslavia 200 Sri Lanka 250 
Hong Kong 3,550 Other 50 Papua New Guinea 7,000 Other 150 
Vidnam 3.550 Indonesia 7,700 Vietnam 35,000 
Phill p pines 1,700 Can1bodia 35.000 
Vietnan1 1,700 
Source World Refugee Survey--1994, USCR * Indicates that sources vary significantly in the numher reported. 
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EliROPE AND NORTH AMERICA TOTAL 2,785,000 
Armenia *290,000 Denmark 23,300 !\lacedonia 12.100 Slonnia *3!i,OOO 
.-\.zcrh:upn *290.000 Fom1er Yugoslm·ia 17300 Former Yugoslavia 12,000 Fom1er Yugoslavia *3~.0()() Austria 77,700 Other 6.000 Other 100 Spain 14,000 Fonner Yugosla1·ia 74.300 Finland 3,700 :"'etherlands 35_400 Fonna Yugosla1·ia 2.20() Other 3.400 Former Yugoslavia 2.200 Norway 14,200 Other 11.800 Az!'l"bai_jan *25LOOO Other 1.500 Former Yugoslavia 12.500 Sweden *58,800 \nncnia *200.01!0 Fr-ance· 30,9(10 Other 1.700 Fom1er Yugosla\"la •su.uou I zhd,~>t:lll 51.000 Fonner Yugc)S]a,·ia 7.000 Poland 600 Other 8.800 Belar"Us 10,400 Other 23.900 Portugal 2,250 Switzerland 27,000 Belgium 32,900 Germany *529,100 Former Yugoslavia !50 Former '(ugoslavia 14.500 Fom1cr Yugc>Sia,·ia 6.000 Fom1er Yugoslavia *300.000 Other 2.100 Other 12.500 Other 26.300 Oth<ot 229.1 00 Romania 1,000 Turke~· *24,600 Busnia and *70,000 Greece 800 Russian *347,500 Fom1er Yugoslavia *20.000 Her-zt·g,•vinia Hunga~· 10,000 Federation lraq 4.000 h1m1er Yugc"la' ia *70.000 Fom1er Yugoslavia 10.000 Georgia *143.000 lran 500 Canada 20,500 Ita!) *33,550 Tajikstan *I 08.000 Other 100 ( ·I"Oatia *280,000 Fom1er Yugoslavia *32.000 Armenia *52.000 l:nited Kingdom 28,100 Fnnn.:-r Yugosl:11·ia *280.000 Other 1.550 A.zerba ij an 25.000 Fom1er Yugoslavia 6.60(J Czech Republk 6,300 Luxembourg 1,500 Afghanistan Other 21.500 Fnm1a Yugosb1·ia 4.!00 Fom1er Yugoslavia 1.300 Somalia 6,500 linited States 150.~00 ()tiler 2.200 Other 200 Iraq 6.000 Yugoslavia *357,000 
Other 7.000 (Serbia! 
Slo\ak Republic 1,900 Montenegro) *3)7.000 
Fom1er Yugoslavia 1.900 Former Yugosial'ia 
Source World Refugee Surwy-- I 994. useR *Indicates that sources V8D significantly in the number rpurted Flgures fur Europe. North Amenca. and Australia are generally those for individuals who applied for asylum in 1993, e:-;cept for 
countries such as Annenia, Croatia. and othersthat do not use individualized asylum procedures. USCR considers Busmans 
and Croatians as having a prima facie claim to refugee status withm the parameters of the Refugee Convention/Protocol. and has tbereJi.1re attempted to include all such persons who have received tempor8D legal status, applied for asylum in 1993. t>r hecn e'cluded J]·om apph·in& for status. Because many countries do not report the republic of origin of "former Yugoslavs. 
"this tahk includes under that heading other asylum seekers fi·om the former Yugoslavw. such as etlmic Albanians irom Kosll\ u 
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LA TIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TOTAL 102,000 
B~liu H.9011 Colombia 400 Guatemala 4,700 Panama 9SII 
El Sa!Yador 6.100 Costa Rica 24,800 El Sal\ador 2.400 El Sahador 4()1) 
l}uat~mala 2.200 :-:icaragua 20.000 1\'icaragua 2.200 :-:icaragua 300 
'1car~1gua 300 El Salvador 4,300 Other 100 Other 250 
Hl'ndur~L' 200 Other 500 Honduras 100 Peru 400 
Other 100 Dominican Republk 1,300 Mexico 52,000 Cuba 400 
Boli\'ia 600 Haiti 1.300 Guatemala 47,000 Venezuela 1,300 
Col()tllhi;~ 350 Ecuador 100 El Salvador 4.000 Cuba 1.000 
Other 250 Colombia 100 Other 1,000 Haiti 200 
Brazil 1,000 El Sal"ador 1SO Nkaragua 4,750 l'\icaragua 100 
Chile 100 l"icaragua 150 El Salvador 4.700 
Peru 100 Other 50 
Source World Refugee Strrvey--1994, USCR 
l\HDDLE EAST TOTAL 4,924,000 
(;aza StJip 603.000 .Jordan 1,073,600 Saudi Arabia 25,000 West Bank 479,011() 
Palestinians 603.000 Pale,'tiniam 1.073.000 !rag 25.000 Palestinians 479.000 
Iran *1.995,000 Former Yugoslavia 400 Syria 319.200 Yemen 60.500 
Afghanistan *1,900,0110 Other 200 Palestinians 314.000 Somalia 57.000 
Iraq 95.000 Lebanon 329,000 Iraq 4.700 Ethiopia uwo 
lrdq 39.500 Palestinians 328.000 Somalia 500 Entrea 1.500 
Iran 38.500 Other 1.000 Oth~r 200 
(Jtha 1.000 
Source World Refugee SurveY--1994, USC:R *Indicates that sources vary significantly in the number reported 
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA TOTAL 2,151,000 
Afl(hanistan 35,0110 India *325,600 Kazakhstan 6.500 Pakistan 1.482.300 
Tajikistan 35.000 China (Tibet) 119,000 TajiJU;'tan 6,500 Afghani;'tan 1,480,000 
Bangladesh 199,000 Sri Lanka *106,400 Kyrgyzstan 3,500 Other 2,300 
Burma 198,800 Bangladesh 53,500 Tajikistan 3,500 Tajikistan 400 
Other 200 Afghanistan 24.400 Nepal 99,100 Afghanistan 400 
Bhutan *20,000 Bhutan 85,100 
Burma 1.600 China 14.000 
Other 700 
s, lllrce World Refguee Survey--1994, USCR *Indicates that sources vary significantly in the number reported. 
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APPENDIX C. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES, 
FY 83-93 
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APPENDIX D. ASYLUM SEEKERS TO THE UNITED STATES, 
FY 1981-FY -1991 BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
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